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CONTRACT BREACHES AND THE 




Scholars have long debated why certain common law breaches in 
American jurisprudence receive criminal punishment (imprisonment) 
while others only receive civil sanctions (monetary damages). 
Scholars like Richard Posner and Guido Calabresi/A. Douglas 
Melamed have used economic-based models and the notion of 
efficiency to explain why tort breaches only receive civil sanctions 
but crimes receive criminal punishment. Others, like John Coffee and 
Paul Robinson, have questioned the explanatory power of these 
models. Instead, they have focused on the moral difference between 
torts and crimes. Simply put, a crime’s intentional nature makes it 
morally worse than the carelessness typified by tortious activity. 
Interestingly, scholars on both sides of the debate have largely 
neglected to include contract breaches—a significant part of common 
law—into their models. Like torts, these breaches also only receive 
civil sanctions. What explains the similar treatment? 
 
This Article makes an original contribution to the literature by 
systematically introducing contract breaches into the broader 
criminal/civil debate. It employs the aforementioned economic and 
moral-based models in an effort to understand the treatment of 
contract breaches. The economic model, and its focus on efficiency, 
predictably explains why these breaches only receive civil sanctions. 
The moral-based model stumbles here. Its focus on intent suggests 
that a contract breach—as intentional conduct—also deserves moral 
blame and thus criminal punishment. What is missing from this 
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model is recognizing the unique nature of the underlying 
responsibility in a contract breach, and specifically, the difference 
between a “voluntary obligation” and a “non-voluntary obligation.” 
This Article takes the innovative step of introducing this distinction 
into the larger criminal/civil debate and using it to conclude that the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scholars have long debated why certain common law breaches in 
American jurisprudence receive criminal punishment (imprisonment) 
while others only receive civil sanctions (monetary damages).1 These 
scholars, however, have focused only on torts and crimes and have 
largely left out contract breaches—a significant part of common law 
doctrine. Like its tort counterpart, this breach also only receives civil 
liability. What explains the similar treatment? This Article makes an 
original contribution to the literature by systematically introducing 
contract breaches into this debate on the criminal/civil divide. 
It is important to say something about harms. Any meaningful 
comparison of these three common law breaches requires equalizing 
the harms involved. Otherwise, the analogy will break down. For 
example, murdering someone is obviously worse than negligently 
destroying property or failing to contractually deliver a good or 
service. Explaining why only murder gets criminal punishment in this 
case does not seem particularly difficult. The harms involved are 
very different. Homicide is qualitatively worse than any damage to 
property or loss of particular service. This assumption about harm is 
important. This Article seeks to understand why, everything else 
being equal, crimes alone receive criminal punishment, while both 
tort and contract breaches only trigger monetary sanctions. 
This Article works out this ceteris paribus claim by appealing to 
laws that safeguard property. A person may not steal your property (a 
crime); she cannot treat your property negligently (a tort); and she 
may not breach a contract by failing to compensate you for your 
property (a contract breach). Take the following three cases: 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Criminal sanctions can include fines, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1 (1985), as well as 
restitution awarded to a victim. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Laura Lee, Edmund Lee, Monetary Recoveries 
for State Crime Victims, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 819 (2010) (noting that some states allow restitution as 
part of defendant’s sentence); Heidi M. Grogan, Characterizing Criminal Restitution Pursuant to the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act: Focus on the Third Circuit, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1079 (2005) (noting 
that the Victim and Witness Protection Act permits federal judges to award criminal victims restitution 
during sentencing); Randy Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime 
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 159-60 (1996) (noting that restitution is part of the punishment 
imposed on a defendant). Civil sanctions include both compensatory and punitive damages. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 347, 355 (1981). 
3
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Scenario (1): You are sitting in a coffee shop2 writing an essay on 
your recently purchased laptop that costs $1,000. You leave to go to 
the bathroom. In your absence, someone quickly steals your 
computer3 (a crime). 
Scenario (2): As you are typing your essay on your recently 
purchased laptop that cost $1,000, someone negligently knocks it 
over. You had taken reasonable care to place it squarely on the table 
so it would not fall.4 It breaks completely and is now worth nothing 
(tort breach). 
Scenario (3): Wanting to sell your laptop, you contract with an 
individual to sell it for $1,000. You give the computer to this person 
and await delivery of the money at the coffee shop (per the contract 
terms). To your dismay, this individual breaches the contract by 
failing to bring the money. The person intentionally decided not to 
honor the terms of the contract. At the time the contract was made, 
this person fully intended to pay you $1,000 and said as much. The 
individual simply changed her mind, even though she had the ability 
to satisfy the terms of the contract (contract breach).5 
In all three cases (collectively, the “Scenarios”), you lose the value 
of the computer. That is, in all Scenarios, you suffer the same 
monetary harm—a loss of $1,000.6 Nevertheless, only in Scenario 
(1), the criminal act, could the perpetrator suffer possible 
imprisonment at the discretion of the state. The perpetrators in 
Scenarios (2) and (3) (the tort and contract breach, respectively) 
                                                                                                                 
 2. These scenarios are set up in a coffee shop to make them as similar as possible. 
 3. This act of taking the computer would constitute larceny under common law as the perpetrator 
permanently intended to deprive the victim of the computer. See, e.g., United States v. Maloney, 607 
F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir. 1979); Edmonds v. State 70 Ala. 8, 9 (1881) (citing Roscoe’s Cr. Ev. 622); 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1 note (consolidating larceny and other acquisitive crimes such as 
embezzlement and false pretenses into the general category of theft) (1962); MODEL PENAL CODE § 
223.2 (1962); 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.8 (2d ed. 2010) (same). For the purpose of this paper, the terms 
“theft” and “larceny” are used interchangeably. 
 4. In other words, there is no issue of contributory negligence, an affirmative defense in tort cases. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 (2010). 
 5. The point here is that the breach was not accidental or unavoidable. The perpetrator simply 
decided not to fulfill the terms of the contract. Perhaps, it was not in the person’s economic interests or 
the person was too lazy to deliver the computer. 
 6. I assume that all computers have the same software and files, making sure their values are equal. 
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would only be subject to monetary damages.7 They will not suffer 
any imprisonment, even though these individuals have caused the 
same harm to you as the criminal in Scenario (1). While this 
distinction may be familiar to us, what explains it? 
The major theories used to account for the varying treatment of 
these breaches can be grouped roughly into two camps: the 
economic-based and moral-based models.8 The economic model 
relies on deterrence and efficiency to explain why torts receive 
monetary damages but crimes receive criminal punishment.9 
According to these scholars, society has a greater economic incentive 
to deter criminal activity than tortious activity. The common phrase 
used here is that “criminal law punishes while tort law prices.”10 The 
moral-based camp has questioned the explanatory power of the 
economic-based arguments. These scholars have argued, instead, that 
the real distinction between crimes and torts lies in the moral 
condemnation of the former but not the latter.11 Crimes generally 
                                                                                                                 
 7. The perpetrator in Scenario (1) would also be subject to a civil suit for damages, probably for the 
tort of conversion. See infra note 45. 
 8. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972); Henry Hart, The Aims 
of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958) (criminal punishment, unlike civil 
sanctions, represents “the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its 
imposition”); Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1194–95 (1985) (economic model); L. Song Richardson, When Human Experimentation Is Criminal, 99 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89, 112–14 (2009) (finding that punishment, unlike civil liability, 
expresses moral condemnation); Paul Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of 
Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 201–02 (1996) (moral-based model). Admittedly, this somewhat 
oversimplifies the scholarship. See generally Kenneth Simmons, The Hand Formula in the Draft 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
901, 909–10 (2001) (noting that the economic approach can be seen as a variation of a utilitarian or 
consequentialists model, whereas as the moral-based approach can be seen as a version of a 
deontological model). Other scholars have put forth more nuanced models. See generally Kenneth G. 
Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 1 (1990); George Fletcher, A Transaction Theory of a Crime?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 921 (1985); 
Alvin Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 905 
(1985). Still, these two models represent the dominant themes in the literature. See Kenneth Simons, The 
Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719 (2008) 
(noting that the moral-based and economic models are the dominant approaches to explaining the 
tort/crime distinction). 
 9. See Calabresi and Melamed, supra note 8; Posner, supra note 8. 
 10. See John Coffee, Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (1991); Robert Cooter, Prices 
and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523–24 (1984). 
 11. See Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts: I, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 756–60 
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constitute purposeful conduct, making them morally worse than the 
carelessness typified by tortious activity.12 
Yet, scholars on both sides of the debate have neglected to apply 
their theories to contract breaches. Perhaps, the thinking is that 
because contract law involves voluntary behavior, it is readily 
understandable why such breaches are not criminally punished and 
nothing more needs to be said. At a conceptual level, it is not clear 
how merely invoking voluntariness, without more, automatically 
vitiates the need for criminal punishment. The victim of a contract 
breach certainly has not consented to the deprivation of her property 
without compensation. Additional explanation seems necessary, 
particularly when economic or moral principles underlie the general 
explanation for the criminal/civil divide. 
To be clear, many scholars have used economics and moral 
principles to analyze contract law. The notion of efficient breach has 
generated significant discussion and holds that breaking a contract is 
sometimes the economically preferable course of action.13 Perhaps, 
less well known is the notion that a contract corresponds to a moral 
obligation to uphold this promise.14 But all of these discussions—
whether economic or moral—center on the internal mechanics of 
contract law (i.e. the analysis occurs intra-contract law). These 
                                                                                                                 
(1943); Robinson, supra note 8. 
 12. It is important to distinguish these two models from similar economic and moral-based 
approaches that seek only to analyze and explain the internal mechanics of torts or crimes. For a 
discussion on tort law, see generally Shawn Bayern, The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort Law, 75 
BROOK. L. REV. 707 (2010); Heidi Hurd, The Deontological of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249 (1996); 
Kenneth Simmons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing 
Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901 (2001). For a discussion on criminal law, 
see generally Marcelo Ferrante, Deterrence and Crime Results, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2007); 
Hamish Stewart, Legality and Morality in H. L. A. Hart’s Theory of Criminal Law, 52 SMU L. REV. 201 
(1999). 
 13. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.10 (7th ed. 2007); Robert L. 
Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 
273, 284–85 (1969); Gil Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its Application to 
Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163, 163–64 (2000); Craig Warkol, Resolving the 
Paradox Between Legal Theory and Legal Fact: The Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 321, 321–22 (1998) (efficient breaches benefit society as a whole). 
 14. See generally RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 
(1994); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Jody Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract 
and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009); Daniel Markovitz, Making and Keeping Contracts, 92 
VA. L. REV. 1325, 1328–29 (2006). 
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scholars have not engaged in the broader discussion of why contract 
breaches—like their tort counterparts—only receive civil liability. 
Here, the scholarship has been restricted to the tort/crime 
dichotomy.15 
Thus, this Article makes an original contribution by applying the 
aforementioned economic and moral-based theories to all three types 
of breaches and explains why crimes alone receive criminal 
punishment. The aim of the Article is not to recommend specific 
normative changes. Perhaps, certain contract breaches should be 
criminalized or some crimes not punished. This Article simply seeks 
to understand what explains why we criminalize one but not the 
others. 
The economic model predictably explains why contract breaches 
are treated like tort breaches. Contracts and torts share an underlying 
efficiency that is in sharp contrast to crimes. The moral-based 
position, however, is not as straightforward and cannot readily 
account for the difference. A contract breach—as intentional-based 
conduct—would also seem to elicit the same moral condemnation as 
a crime and thus warrant criminal punishment.16 This is particularly 
true if one includes contract breaches based on fraudulent 
inducement as to an intended obligation; these instances of deception 
or trickery also typically do not receive criminal punishment.17 What 
is missing from the moral-based model is recognizing the unique 
nature of the underlying responsibility in a contract breach. For this, 
this Article distinguishes between a “non-voluntary obligation” and a 
“voluntary obligation.”18 The former automatically applies to all 
                                                                                                                 
 15. In one respect, this is not surprising. Torts and crimes share a common history. See David J. 
Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 59, 59–60 
(1996) (noting that in early common law, tort and crime both constituted a breach against the king’s 
peace); see also Bruce Benson, The Lost Victim and Other Failures of the Public Law Experiment, 9 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 411 (1986); Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 241, 250 (2005). 
 16. See, e.g., Grant Lamond, What Is a Crime?, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD., 609 619–20 (2007) 
(noting that the intentional nature of a contract breach suggests that, at least conceptually, it too could 
receive criminal punishment). 
 17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162, 164 (1981). Particularly egregious 
instances of fraudulent inducement may receive punitive damages, a type of civil sanction. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). For a discussion of these breaches, see infra Part II.C. 
 18. Cf. Kraus, supra note 14. Kraus uses similar terminology, but his discussion focuses on the 
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members of society, and thus, corresponds to tort and criminal legal 
duties. On the other hand, a voluntary obligation must be 
affirmatively undertaken, much like contractual responsibilities. 
Recognizing this fundamental difference can save the moral-based 
model. Understood in this way, the moral-based and economic-based 
theories can actually be integrated into a unified model. 
There are limitations to this analysis. It does not attempt to explain 
the law’s varying treatment of all crimes versus all torts or contract 
breaches. Instead, its focus is on the prototypical common law 
breach.19 There are various indeterminacies within these bodies of 
law that prevent any analysis from being true in all circumstances. 
For instance, most jurisdictions today rely on a statutory criminal 
framework in lieu of common law.20 This framework includes a host 
of various violations, many of which are considered regulatory in 
nature.21 This Article seeks to explain the treatment of those familiar 
common law origin crimes against property or person that require 
criminal intent.22 
The Article is divided into five parts. Part I lays out the parameters 
of each respective common law breach, as well as three related 
scenarios involving the safeguarding of property. Part II focuses on 
the economic model and how it handily explains the respective 
sanctions all three common law breaches receive. Parts III and IV 
analyze the moral-based approach and its shortcomings when it 
comes to contract breaches. Finally, Part V explores the distinction 
                                                                                                                 
unique underlying moral nature of contractual responsibilities. See infra note 264. 
 19. This excludes many types of breaches, including strict liability crimes and intentional torts. See 
infra Part I.A. 
 20. 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 2.1 (2d ed. 2010); Chad Flanders, The One-State Solution to Teaching 
Criminal Law, or, Leaving the Common Law and the PPC Behind, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 167, 177 
(2010). 
 21. This framework is most apparent with the distinction between malum in se and malum 
prohibitum crimes. Malum in se crimes have a stigma of immorality and include acts like murder and 
rape. Malum prohibitum crimes, on the other hand, are “criminal simply because [they are] prohibited 
by statutes; [they are] not necessarily immoral in [their] own right.” Zoe Prebble & John Prebble, The 
Morality of Tax Avoidance, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 693, 728 (2010). 
 22. See generally 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.6 (2d ed. 2010); Combs, supra note 15, at 253 (noting that 
common law crimes required a “bad mind” and, at least with malum in se crimes, generally arose from 
notions of natural law). In fact, one scholar notes that a malum prohibitum crime is “basically a non-
criminal tort that is prosecuted by society at large.” Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8, at 36 n.189. 
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between voluntary and non-voluntary obligations, in an effort to 
rehabilitate the moral-based model and explain the treatment of 
contract breaches. 
I. THE BASIC COMMON LAW BREACHES AND SAFEGUARDING 
PROPERTY 
A.   Contract Breaches, Torts, and Crimes 
The basic common law doctrines of a contract breach, tort, and 
crime are readily known. A contract constitutes a promise for which 
the law gives a remedy in case of breach.23 Formation requires 
mutual assent and consideration.24 Courts use an objective test. It 
does not matter what the parties subjectively believed during the 
contract’s formation, as long as they manifested the appropriate 
intent.25 A breach occurs when one party does not perform under the 
contract.26 This is a strict liability standard.27 If a party contravenes 
the terms of the contract, the party is in breach, regardless of her 
motivations or state of mind.28 While accidental breaches are 
possible, it stands to reason that most breaches will be intentional.29 
A breach entitles a person to bring suit for any money damages 
resulting from the nonperformance of the contract; however, the state 
does not seek non-monetary sanctions, such as imprisonment, for 
such breaches.30 Usually, the damages consist of what the victim 
                                                                                                                 
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). 
 24. Id. ch. 3. 
 25. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 
cmt. B (1981) (“The phrase ‘manifestation of intention’ adopts an external or objective standard for 
interpreting conduct; it means the external expression of intention as distinguished from undisclosed 
intention.”) (emphasis added); id. § 21; Lawrence M. Solan, Contract As Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 353, 354–55 (2007). 
 26. 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:1 (4th ed. 2010). 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (1981). 
 28. Id. 
 29. In fact, the efficient breach hypothesis finds that a person should breach a contract if doing so 
would be more economically desirable than performing under the contract. See Richard Brooks, The 
Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568 (2006); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, 
Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement 
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977); infra Part II.B. 
 30. See 23 WILLISTON, supra note 26, § 64:1. 
9
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would have received from the contract or any loss she suffered as a 
result of making the contract.31 
Tort law also only allows for a private right of action.32 It is 
commonly understood as a mechanism for individuals to seek redress 
for wrongs against them.33 Typically, a tort breach requires a failure 
to exercise a reasonable duty of a care where the conduct proximately 
causes some identifiable harm34 to the victim.35 A defendant only 
needs to be negligent in exercising this duty of care to be liable for 
any resulting damage to the victim.36 
Crimes stand apart from both torts and contracts. The state can 
prosecute these acts and seek sanctions including imprisonment.37 A 
crime typically requires a wrongful deed or act, an actus reus, 
combined with a guilty state of mind, a mens rea.38 The defendant 
does not need to be successful in completing the prohibited act. As 
long the person intended to cause the harm and takes some 
affirmative action, this person can be punished.39 
The aforementioned types of torts and crimes are just the typical 
cases. For instance, there are intentional torts and strict liability 
crimes; but these are outliers and are not the focus of this Article.40 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (1981) (“The purpose[] of awarding 
contract damages is to compensate the injured party. . . . For this reason, courts in contract cases do not 
award damages to punish the party in breach or to serve as an example to others unless the conduct 
constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.”); id. §§ 347, 356. 
Relief may also consist of specific performance, depending on the terms of the contract. See id. § 357. 
 32. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 4 (2001) (the “purpose of tort liability” is 
“primarily to vindicate the individual victim and the victim’s rights”). 
 33. See Combs, supra note 15, at 251. 
 34. Harm includes bodily harm, real property damage, or tangible personal property damage. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 4 (2010). 
 35. See id. § 6. 
 36. Id. 
 37. The state can also pursue fines as applicable. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 302.1 (1985). 
 38. See 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 5.1 (2d ed. 2010) (One may be criminally liable based on 
purposefulness, recklessness, gross negligence, or even strict liability.); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 
(1985) (Most crimes, including statutory crimes, require some kind of ill motive or bad intention.); see 
also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980). 
 39. 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 11.2 (2d ed. 2010). 
 40. For a discussion of intentional torts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 5 (2010). There are 
also certain strict liability torts, but these are extremely narrow in scope. See generally id. ch. 20. For a 
discussion of strict liability crimes, see 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. §§ 5.1, 5.5 (2d ed. 2010). These crimes are 
considered the exception, even amongst statutory crimes, to the general rule requiring an “evil-meaning 
mind.” Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 n.4. It is not uncommon for scholars to put aside intentional torts and 
10
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Moreover, the main goal is to understand why, everything else being 
equal, crimes receive criminal punishment, but tort and contract 
breaches only receive civil liability. This requires equalizing the 
harms. An intentional tort, like defamation or infliction of emotional 
distress, does not have a criminal equivalent.41 We do not normally 
criminalize defamatory statements or words that merely hurt a 
person’s feelings.42 So, it makes little sense to use this type of tort 
because of the difficulty in finding a criminal act that causes the same 
harm. 
Strict liability crimes (e.g., statutory rape) would also not work 
here. Again, these are outliers. They do not require intent and thus do 
not originate from the common law.43 Moreover, using a strict 
liability crime as the model criminal act would create the same issue 
of trying to find an equivalent tort or contract breach that causes the 
same harm. 
Certain conduct also creates both tort and criminal liability.44 For 
instance, the act of taking someone’s property would constitute theft, 
a crime, and conversion, a tort breach.45 However, there is no point to 
compare these two types of acts because the underlying conduct 
could receive both civil and criminal sanctions. This Article’s focus 
centers on conduct that causes the same kind of harm as a criminal 
act, but nevertheless, does not receive criminal punishment. That is, 
assuming equal harm, why do certain torts and contract breaches only 
                                                                                                                 
strict liability crimes when analyzing the distinctive treatment of torts and crimes. See, e.g., Claire 
Finkelstein, The Irrelevance of the Intended to Prima Facie Culpability: Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L. 
REV. 335, 345–46 (1996); Aya Gruber, Righting Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical 
Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim Liability Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 486–87 (2004). 
 41. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965), with 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. (2d ed. 2010). 
 42. Some jurisdictions do criminalize defamation by statute. See, e.g., Thomas v. City of Baxter 
Springs, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293 (D. Kan. 2005) (Kansas statute); I.M.L. v. State, 61 P.3d 1038, 
1040–41 (Utah 2002) (Utah Statute). This comparison still would not have been useful since the 
underlying conduct would receive both criminal and civil sanctions. 
 43. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 n.4; 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. §§ 5.1, 5.5, 17.4 (2d ed. 2010). 
 44. See Nathan Isaac Combs, Civil Aiding and Abetting Liability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 241, 250 (2005). 
 45. See 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 1.3 (2d ed. 2010). The elements of conversion, RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965), are similar to the elements of larceny, 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.2 (2d 
ed. 2010). James Lindgren, Why the Ancients May Not Have Needed a System of Criminal Law, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 29, 36 (1996); see 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (finding that particular 
conduct can constitute both a crime and tort); Thomas Colby, Clearing the Smoke From Phillip Morris 
v. Williams: The Past, Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L. J. 392, 424 (2008). 
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receive monetary damages while the equivalent crime, causing the 
same harm, receives criminal punishment? This requires identifying a 
harm that results equally from all three types of acts as well as 
isolating those tort and contract breaches that only receive civil 
sanctions. 
B.   Equalizing Harms: The Safeguarding of Property 
As stated earlier, this Article looks to three primary ways in which 
the law safeguards property: someone may not steal your property, 
Scenario (1); she may not treat your property negligently, Scenario 
(2); and she may not breach a contract by failing to compensate you 
for your property, Scenario (3). In all three Scenarios, you lose the 
value of the computer, but only in Scenario (1) could the perpetrator 
suffer possible imprisonment at the discretion of the state.46 
You could very well decide not to sue the perpetrator in Scenarios 
(2) and (3) for the value of the computer. Or, maybe the perpetrator 
in both Scenarios (2) and (3) decides to give you $1,000 the next day. 
In either of these two situations, the individual, for all practical 
purposes, would be “off the hook” and suffer no further sanctions. 
On the other hand, even if the perpetrator in Scenario (1) gives you 
$1,000 the next day or you choose not to sue, the state can still 
prosecute the individual with the threat of imprisonment.47 
In short, stealing is treated differently than both contractually 
failing to deliver property and negligently destroying it. Only with 
stealing does one suffer criminal punishment and the possible loss of 
liberty. This difference may be familiar, but what explains it? 
Someone not familiar with our legal system may think that all three 
acts should receive criminal punishment because they caused the 
same harm. Or perhaps, this person would say that all acts, including 
the crime, should receive only monetary sanctions. As stated earlier, 
scholars have attempted to explain why torts and crimes receive 
                                                                                                                 
 46. You may also decide to sue the perpetrator in Scenario (1) for the value of the computer based 
on the tort of conversion. See supra note 45. 
 47. As long as the perpetrator intended to deprive you of the computer when she took it, she can be 
guilty of larceny, even if she later decides to compensate you for the loss. See People v. Pond, 284 P.2d 
793, 799 (Cal. 1955); 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.5 (2d ed. 2010). 
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different sanctions. They rely on the concepts of efficiency and 
culpability. But what is missing from their analysis is explaining the 
contract breach. 
The obvious difference between Scenario (3) and the others is the 
voluntary or consensual nature of entering into a contract. One might 
argue that this fact alone explains why the contract breach only 
receives civil sanctions. But the discussion cannot end there. For one 
thing, consent is not the operative principle used to distinguish torts 
and crimes. These models rely on economic and moral-based 
principles to explain this distinction. As this Article will show, 
voluntariness plays an integral role in explaining the treatment of 
these breaches, but more explanation is necessary as to how this 
concept informs the economic and moral-based models (see infra 
Sections II and V). 
For now, it is enough to say that if consent or voluntariness is 
important, in what way does it, alone, explain the treatment of these 
breaches? Take the perspective of the perpetrator. The fact that this 
individual voluntarily entered into the contract does not suggest 
impunity. In fact, the contract breacher had the option not to enter 
into a contract and not take on the responsibility of paying money for 
the computer. It is not clear why this person receives the benefit—
unlike the perpetrator in Scenario (1)—of being exempt from 
criminal punishment. From the victim’s perspective, consent also 
does not suggest impunity. You did not consent to having the 
contract breached. Quite the contrary, you voluntarily entered into a 
contract, expecting that the person would pay you the money for your 
computer. 
Simply invoking the terms “consent” or “voluntariness,” without 
more analysis, becomes even less compelling when talking about a 
contract breach based on a fraudulent inducement. In such a case, an 
individual makes a false representation regarding an intended 
obligation that induces the other party to enter into the contract.48 For 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 171 (1981) (discussing fraudulent inducement 
where the promisor falsely expresses an intention to perform); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 
474 (1932); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
13
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example, take the permutation of Scenario (3) where the perpetrator, 
at the time of making the contract, manifested an intent to pay you 
the money but never really had any intention of following through on 
the contractual obligation (e.g., she did not have the money). In short, 
the person deceived you by making a fraudulent promise. This is 
different from Scenario (3), as articulated above, where the 
perpetrator fully intended to pay the money and manifested as much, 
but later changed her mind.49 But, even in the case of fraudulent 
inducement, the perpetrator will typically not be subject criminal 
punishment for failing to pay the money owed.50 At most, if the 
conduct were particularly egregious, the perpetrator may be subject 
to punitive damages, a type of heightened civil liability.51 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 
(Tex. 1998) (distinguishing fraudulent inducement from a normal contract breach). It is important to 
distinguish fraudulent inducement—a false representation of a future action or promise—from the crime 
of taking property by false pretenses, which typically involve a false representation of a past or present 
fact. See 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.7 (2d ed. 2010). 
 50. Some jurisdictions criminalize this type of fraudulent inducement. See MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 223.3; Ellen Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 752 (1999) (explaining the evolution of 
federal fraud statues, such as mail fraud that criminalize false promises); Michael A. DiSabatino, 
Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Crime of False Pretenses Cannot Be Predicated upon Present 
Intention Not to Comply with Promise or Statement as to Future Act, 19 A.L.R. 4th 959 (1983) 
(collecting cases showing that a growing number of jurisdictions criminalize this behavior, while others 
have continued to treat this act as a civil violation). The fear in criminalizing this type of behavior is that 
a jurisdiction “blur[s] the boundary between acceptable and criminal conduct.” John Diamond, Reviving 
Lenity and Honest Belief at the Boundaries of Criminal Law, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 8 (2010); 
Helen Gunnarsson, Fraudulent Misrepresentation Tort Limited to Business, 96 ILL. B.J. 282 (2008) 
(noting that in Illinois, the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation has been traditionally limited to the 
business setting, whereas the same type of fraudulent misrepresentation may constitute criminal conduct 
in a non-business setting). In fact, under common law, this type of false promise was never considered 
criminal, and even the Model Penal Code cautions that commercial transactions involving false 
promises may not merit criminal punishment. 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.7 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that the 
traditional view was that fraudulent promises were not criminalized but that the modern view has moved 
in the direction of criminalizing these acts); Diamond, supra, at 7–8; Arthur Pearce, Theft by False 
Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 967–68 (1953) (noting that American courts generally have not 
criminalized the taking of property by false promises). These concerns do not exist with larceny as 
articulated in Scenario (1), which is universally classified as a crime without reservation. See, e.g., 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2; 3 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.2 (2d ed. 2010). Given this state of affairs, this 
Article is useful in explaining why these two acts (larceny vs. fraudulent inducement) trigger such 
different reactions and treatment. That said, this Article focuses on comparing why certain conduct that 
causes the same harm as a crime would only receive civil sanctions. This limitation would exclude 
fraudulent inducement if it receives criminal punishment. See infra Part II.C. So, this Article makes the 
reasonable assumption that such conduct would not receive criminal punishment. 
 51. See, e.g., Great W. Sav. Bank v. George Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 580 (Alaska 1989); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). 
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While fraudulent inducement may be classified as a distinct 
intentional tort,52 it is better understood as arising from a contractual 
relationship.53 By definition, it requires voluntary action by both 
parties—the person must make a false representation and the other 
party must rely on it to her detriment.54 Most cases of fraudulent 
inducement arise in contract-type settings, such as buying or selling 
goods.55 This type of reliance is not present in the normal negligence 
tort, such as Scenario (2). Here, the perpetrator simply failed to use 
the appropriate duty of care. 
Scenario (3’) will constitute the same set of facts and resulting 
breach as Scenario (3) articulated above. Only this time, the 
perpetrator falsely represented an intention to pay the money during 
the formation of the contract. The victim has the option to bring a 
civil suit against this person. But this remedy—applicable to 
Scenarios (3) and (3’)—begs the same question. Why do both of 
these types of common law breaches only receive civil liability? 
Again, the harm—loss of the computer—remains the same as in the 
criminal act. And just like the criminal, the perpetrators in Scenarios 
(3) and (3’) intentionally deprived the victim of this property. With 
fraudulent inducement, the perpetrator actually deceived you to give 
her your computer without ever intending to pay the money. 
C.   The Public/Private Distinction 
The simplest and probably most widely known explanation for the 
criminal/civil divide—though the literature focuses only on torts and 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 47 (noting that fraudulent inducement is 
distinct from the contract itself); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977). 
 53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 525 (1977) (citing contract-type cases where fraudulent inducement may apply); Frank Cavico, 
Fraudulent, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation in the Employment Context: The Deceitful, 
Careless, Thoughtless Employer, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 84 (1997) (recognizing the relationship 
between tort and contract in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation and noting a “tort would arise out of 
the contractual setting when an act of inducing or breaching the contractual agreement gives rise to a 
separate and independent cause of action in tort”). 
 54. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 960 S.W.2d at 47 (describing elements of fraudulent 
inducement); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND) chs. 3–4 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 525 (1977). 
 55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525, 549 (1977). 
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crimes—relies on the distinction between an injury to society and an 
injury to the individual.56 This private/public distinction dates back to 
at least Blackstone, who defines a tort as a “private wrong[] . . . of 
the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as 
individuals,” whereas a crime represents a “public wrong[] or . . . a 
breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole 
community . . . in it’s [sic] social aggregate capacity.”57 Scholars 
have elaborated on this rudimentary distinction in an effort to 
distinguish these two types of breaches and explain why only crimes 
trigger criminal punishment.58 But, it is not clear how merely 
appealing to the terms “private wrong” and “public wrong” does the 
trick. More is required.59 Scholars have pointed out that public harms 
are usually just private wrongs writ large.60 For example, a person’s 
“private interest in the enforcement of a contract can also be 
described as the collective, public interest in the security of 
transactions.”61 Another scholar highlights the same problem by 
arguing that society cares not just about preventing crimes; it also 
cares about the fulfillment of contracts and the avoidance of traffic 
accidents.62 
Merely relying on the terms “public wrong” and “private wrong” 
would be especially unpersuasive with the Scenarios articulated 
above. Here, the harm is equal. In what way does Scenario (1) alone 
involve a public wrong, thus warranting criminal punishment? In all 
three Scenarios, the victim is wronged in the same way—the loss of 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See generally 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 19.5 (2d ed. 2010). 
 57. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *5; Coffee, supra note 10, at 221. 
 58. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 60 (1974) (explaining the difference 
by appealing to the notion that crimes create public fear in a way that torts do not). See generally 
George Fletcher, Domination in Wrongdoing, 76 B.U. L. REV. 347 (1996) (focusing on notion of 
dominance in explaining the difference between the public wrong of a criminal act and the private 
wrong of a tort); Lamond, supra note 16, at 619–20 (using the public/private divide to suggest that what 
distinguishes crimes from torts or contract breaches is the fact that only crimes are prosecuted by the 
state). 
 59. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 221; 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 23–24, 328–30 (1959). 
For a critique of this position, see Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justification for the 
Tort/Crime Distinction, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 398, 402–03 (1980). 
 60. See Coffee, supra note 10, at 221; Pound, supra note 59, at 23–24, 328–30. 
 61. Coffee, supra note 10, at 221. 
 62. See id.; Hart, supra note 8, at 403. 
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the value of the computer. It is not clear what makes the crime a 
“public” offense and the tort and contract breach “private” offenses. 
It will not do to simply say that only crimes are prosecuted by the 
state, and thus, are public in nature. This is almost tautological. More 
importantly, we still need an explanation as to why crimes receive 
criminal punishment, whereas contract and tort breaches only receive 
monetary damages. This Article focuses on two models used to 
explain this criminal/civil divide—the economic and moral-based 
models.63 
II. THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND THE EFFICIENCY-DETERRENCE 
RELATIONSHIP 
The economic-based model for distinguishing between civil and 
criminal liability has a long and developed history.64 This Article 
focuses on three representative theories from Richard Posner, Guido 
Calabresi/A. Douglas Melamed, and Steven Shavell. 
Richard Posner provides one of the earlier and more famous 
economic models.65 He essentially relies on the efficiency of 
voluntary transactions over involuntary transactions to explain the 
distinction between criminal punishment and civil or monetary 
sanctions.66 His argument is based on two propositions: First, the 
                                                                                                                 
 63. These theories are not the only ones. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8; Fletcher, supra note 
8; Gruber, supra note 40; Klevorick, supra note 8. 
 64. Gary Becker probably provides one of the earliest comprehensive accounts of an economic 
explanation for criminal punishment. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). His basic argument is that a breach is classified as a crime because it is 
harder to catch criminals and not all criminals will be caught; so, the penalty imposed will have to 
exceed actual damages (i.e., compensatory damages). Id. at 191–92. He argues that imprisonment is 
used because not all individuals would be able to effectively compensate victims if the punishment were 
monetary damages alone. Id. at 196. Other scholars have further developed this economic approach to 
explaining the criminal/civil distinction. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8; Dau-Schmidt, supra 
note 8; Klevorick, supra note 8; Posner, supra note 8; Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal 
Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985). 
 65. Posner, supra note 8. 
 66. Posner also applies economic principles to explain the varying kinds of criminal punishment. Id. 
at 1214–25. Why, for instance, does first-degree murder receive greater punishment than second-degree 
murder or manslaughter? Posner’s explanation focuses on the probability of apprehension in each 
respective case. Id. at 1222–23. Posner, in fact, provides intra-economic based analyses for all three 
common law breaches, as well as other legal breaches. See generally POSNER, supra note 13. 
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major function of criminal punishment is to prevent individuals 
“from bypassing the system of voluntary, compensated exchange”—
the marketplace—for the less efficient “forced exchange” 
exemplified by the criminal act;67 second, tort law with its privately 
enforced suits for monetary damages cannot effectively deter this 
kind of bypassing.68 
As to the first proposition, Posner argues that crimes generally 
consist of inefficient, forced transfers intended to bypass the 
voluntary market of exchange.69 He uses the example of coveting a 
neighbor’s car.70 He contends that it is more efficient to negotiate 
with the neighbor for the car than simply taking it.71 Stealing the car 
cannot improve the allocation of resources.72 It cannot “move 
resources from a less to a more valuable employment” because the 
person taking the car is not willing to pay an agreed upon price.73 
Moreover, if the perpetrator is allowed to take the car, she will 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Posner, supra note 8, at 1195. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Posner, supra note 8, at 1196. Posner finds “acquisitive crimes—such as burglary, robbery, fraud 
(false pretenses), embezzlement, extortion (by threat of violence), most kidnapping, some murder, some 
assault and some rape” as clear examples of forced exchanges. Id. He recognizes that some crimes might 
be considered “crimes of passion,” and so they do not have—at least ostensibly—anything to do with 
bypassing the marketplace. Id. at 1198. He cites the example of killing someone because you hate them, 
instead of because you want their money, or someone raping an individual because this person takes 
pleasure in this activity. Id. at 1197–98. Posner contends that these perpetrators can be seen as bypassing 
the “implicit market” of friendship, love, or consensual sex. Id. at 1197, 1199; see also GARY BECKER, 
A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (discussing the economics of familial relationships). But see Gil 
Lahav, A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 163, 183–86 (discussing how some scholars consider certain instances of theft to 
constitute efficient behavior). 
 70. Posner, supra note 8, at 1196. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1195. It is important to note that this notion of efficiency is not a simple utilitarian 
calculation. See Markovitz, supra note 14, at 1332 n.13 (noting that the efficiency calculus works 
differently than a straightforward utilitarian calculus); POSNER, supra note 13, § 1.2. Posner, in fact, 
recognizes that stealing the car may “confer more utility (pleasure, satisfaction)” on the perpetrator than 
the victim. Posner, supra note 8, at 1196 n.9. But, what matters is the economic value, which is 
“measured by willingness to pay for what is not yours already, or willingness to accept payment for 
what is yours.” Id.; see also Fred McChesney, Desperately Shunning Science, 71 B.U. L. REV. 281, 
283–85 (1991) (explaining that under the economic model, crime has no net social usefulness and 
eradication is desirable); Stephen Marks, Utility and Community, Musings on the Tort/Crime 
Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 215, 215–16 (1996) (noting that some scholars include the benefit to the 
criminal when assessing overall utility, while others do not take this benefit into account, and positing a 
theory that accounts for both variations). 
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expend resources to do so, which will increase the victim’s incentive 
to expend resources to prevent the car from being taken.74 This 
activity will increase net expenditures, with no social benefit.75 So, 
stealing is inefficient, and it is in society’s interest to deter it.76 
But, if the point of criminal law is to discourage this inefficient 
behavior, Posner rightly asks why tort law is not enough of a 
deterrent.77 His answer focuses on the ineffectiveness of pricing 
crimes. He explains that while affluent members of society may be 
kept in line with only monetary sanctions, non-affluent members of 
society will not be sufficiently deterred.78 They typically will not 
have the money to pay. This is particularly true for crimes of 
violence such as murder and rape, which would be priced very 
high.79 Criminal punishment, and specifically imprisonment, would 
be the optimal type of sanction.80 
Posner goes on to say that efficiency considerations militate 
against imposing criminal sanctions for the typical tort.81 Posner 
finds that if we criminalize torts, this would needlessly deter 
economically valuable or efficient behavior.82 He uses the case of 
carelessly injuring someone in an automobile accident.83 If the 
penalty were imprisonment, people would drive too slowly or not 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Posner, supra note 8, at 1196. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1196. Posner applies the same efficiency explanation to strict liability crimes, such as 
statutory rape. Id. at 1221–22. He seems to claim that this conduct also represents an attempt to bypass 
the voluntary market of exchange—in this case, voluntary sexual acts with adults. Id. at 1199. Strict 
liability works here because society is not concerned about curtailing lawful activity on the border—
intercourse with young, but age appropriate, individuals. Id. at 1222. Posner’s model also strives to 
explain inchoate crimes. Id. at 1217–20. Punishing criminal attempts not only deters the individual who 
was unsuccessful from trying again, but also other individuals who may be considering bypassing the 
voluntary market of exchange. Id. at 1217–18. 
 77. Id. at 1201. 
 78. Id. at 1204–05. 
 79. Id. at 1202 (recognizing that setting the monetary amount for such crimes would not be easy). 
 80. Posner concedes that this notion suggests “criminal law is designed primarily for the nonaffluent; 
the affluent are kept in line, for the most part, by tort law.” Posner, supra note 8, at 1204–05. He finds 
nothing problematic with this conclusion given that efficiency may dictate differing sanctions depending 
on one’s wealth. Id. Posner also recognizes that criminal punishment may include fines, which can also 
deter bypassing the market of voluntary transaction. Id. at 1206–07. 
 81. Id. at 1204–05. 
 82. Id. at 1206. 
 83. Id. 
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all.84 Because driving is an economically valuable activity, we do not 
want to discourage this conduct.85 Compensation, instead of criminal 
punishment, represents the optimal sanction.86 
 Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed present a different 
economic-based model.87 They begin by articulating the concept of 
an “entitlement,” which represents something of value, such as a 
good or service.88 Society uses various rules to protect or otherwise 
compensate for such entitlements.89 For Calabresi and Melamed, the 
distinction between criminal sanctions and tort sanctions rests on the 
distinction between property and liability rules.90 A property rule 
protects an entitlement so that someone who wishes to acquire that 
entitlement must buy it from the owner in a voluntary transaction.91 
For example, if someone wants to buy another person’s car, the car 
being the entitlement, she must negotiate with the buyer for the price 
to be paid. This generally represents the most efficient mechanism 
for the transfer of goods.92 It improves the allocation of resources 
without making anyone worse off.93 Calabresi and Melamed contend 
that criminal sanctions are used to deter individuals from 
undermining an entitlement protected by such a property rule.94 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. 
 85. This idea also generally explains the case of intentional torts where the underlying conduct is not 
subject to any criminal sanctions. Like negligent behavior, this conduct would have some economic 
value. Take the case of defamation. The underlying conduct—writing and talking about individuals—
may serve some economic value, so we would not want to criminalize cases of defamation. Individuals 
would be afraid to speak their mind. The optimal deterrence would be monetary damages, which may 
include punitive damages, depending on the nature of the tort violation. Posner, supra note 8, at 1204. 
 86. Id. Posner relies on the famous Hand Formula to determine what constitutes negligence or a 
violation of the standard duty of care. Id. 
 87. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8. 
 88. Id. at 1090. 
 89. Naturally, society must initially determine to whom the entitlement belongs. It must seek to 
decide how this entitlement will be protected or whether the individual can sell or trade that entitlement. 
Id. at 1090, 1092. 
 90. Calabresi and Melamed also explain that certain entitlements are inalienable, e.g., your freedom 
to be sold into slavery, meaning that they cannot be transferred or otherwise bargained away. Id. at 
1092–93, 1112. 
 91. Id. at 1092. 
 92. Id. at 1093–94, 1110. 
 93. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1095. Calabresi and Melamed explicitly rely on 
Pareto efficiency to describe this type of behavior. This type of transaction improves the condition of 
one person without making another worse off. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1124–25. 
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On the other hand, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule 
when someone destroys or takes an entitlement and then must pay for 
it after the fact based on some objectively determined value.95 Take 
the case of an individual who negligently causes a car accident in 
which a victim suffers physical harm. According to Calabresi and 
Melamed, the most efficient way to deal with this tort would be to 
assess monetary damages after the fact, i.e. employ a liability rule.96 
Using a property rule instead would not be an efficient means to deal 
with this kind of negligent injury. If victims were given a property 
entitlement to being accidentally injured, we would have to require 
all who engage in such activities that may cause injury, e.g., driving, 
to negotiate before the accident.97 Under what terms would a person 
negotiate the right not to negligently injure another? How much 
would the right to accidentally “knock off an arm or a leg” cost?98 
These kinds of pre-accident negotiations “would be . . . expensive 
[and] often prohibitively so.”99 Therefore, it is more cost effective to 
use a liability rule when it comes to these kinds of torts.100 
The case of crimes is different. Take again the example of a person 
stealing someone’s car. One might rightly ask, is it not more efficient 
to simply charge the thief for the value of the car? In other words, 
why not use a liability rule here similar to the case of a negligent 
tort?101 Here the efficiency considerations militate against liability 
rules and in favor of property rules. Calabresi and Melamed cite two 
problems with using liability rules.102 First, there is the expense 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 1092. 
 96. Id. at 1108–09. 
 97. Id. at 1094. 
 98. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1108. 
 99. Id. at 1108–09. 
 100. Calabresi and Melamed also argue that for certain intentional torts such as nuisance, a liability 
rule—as opposed to a property rule—may be the more efficient rule for protecting the relevant 
entitlement. In short, it may be harder to determine ex ante which party is the cheapest cost avoider, and 
so imposing a rule that compensates after the fact—based on an objective valuation—provides the most 
efficient way to deal with this kind of tort. Id. at 1119. Calabresi and Melamed also explain why 
punitive damages may be used for intentional torts. They argue that this additional compensation—over 
and above compensatory damages—represents the tortfeasor’s knowledge, contrasted with the case of 
negligence, of the harm caused. Id. at 1126 n.71. 
 101. Id. at 1124. 
 102. Id. at 1125. 
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involved in arriving at a collectively objective valuation of the car.103 
More importantly, any such valuation would merely be an 
approximate value determined after the fact, not something 
negotiated by the owner and the perpetrator beforehand.104 So, there 
is no guarantee that this kind of transfer—via liability rule—would 
be an efficient transfer, i.e. improve the allocation of resources 
without making someone worse off. The thief may value the car more 
than the damages she must pay.105 This twofold argument is even 
stronger with bodily integrity. For example, Calabresi and Melamed 
explain that society cannot presume to collectively and objectively 
value the cost of a rape to the victim compared to the benefit of the 
rapist.106 
This consequently explains the reason for criminal punishment. 
Some “kicker,” e.g., imprisonment, must be added to prevent future 
attempts at undermining property rules, which represent the most 
efficient way of protecting the relevant entitlements.107 
Steven Shavell presents an economic model that relies on five 
factors to explain why crimes receive nonmonetary punishment, like 
imprisonment, but torts only receive monetary sanctions.108 He 
begins with the relatively uncontroversial assumption that 
nonmonetary sanctions are overall more costly than monetary 
sanctions.109 Based on the additional cost, the former should be 
employed only where monetary sanctions cannot adequately deter the 
conduct.110 
He then turns to the five factors used to calculate the appropriate 
level of deterrence.111 The first three factors generally bear on a 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1125. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1126. This explanation would apply to both completed and attempted criminal acts. 
 108. Shavell, supra note 64, at 1236–37. 
 109. Id. at 1235. Shavell contends that with monetary sanctions, the disutility the party must pay is 
roughly balanced by the utility to the party who receives the payment. This balance nets little social 
costs. However, with nonmonetary sanctions, the disutility to the punished party is not balanced in any 
automatic way by some utility to another party. Moreover, nonmonetary sanctions require additional 
social costs related to apprehending individuals and operating prisons. Id. at 1235–36. 
 110. Id. at 1236. 
 111. Id. at 1236–37. 
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party’s ability to pay.112 They include the size of a party’s assets, the 
probability that a party will escape sanctions, and the benefits a party 
will enjoy from the act.113 The other two factors include “the 
probability that an act will cause harm and the magnitude of the 
harm.”114 
Shavell explains that with most crimes, these five factors suggest 
that monetary sanctions would be inadequate to deter the behavior.115 
Similar to Posner, he finds that criminal sanctions work best with the 
nonaffluent. As to the first factor, Shavell argues that because 
“criminals as a class seem to have relatively little wealth,”116 it is 
unlikely that monetary sanctions would sufficiently deter their 
criminal behavior.117 Given the fact that many crimes are not always 
punished and the defendant is not always caught, Shavell finds that 
the second factor also militates in favor of nonmonetary sanctions.118 
Specifically, a potential criminal—who probably does not have a 
large number of his own assets—would gain a lot from his crime, 
suggesting a monetary sanction would not adequately deter the 
perpetrator. Because a criminal purposefully commits a crime, the 
probability of success is high, or at least higher, than if she did not 
intend the harm.119 For the same reason, Shavell suggests that the 
magnitude of the harm caused would also generally be high.120 In 
total, these five factors suggest that “something more than monetary 
sanctions must be employed to achieve an adequate degree of 
deterrence in the core area of crimes.”121 
Shavell goes on to explain why these same five factors favor using 
the cheaper method of monetary sanctions for the typical tort breach 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1236–37. 
 114. Shavell, supra note 64, at 1237. 
 115. Id. at 1237–38. 
 116. Shavell explains that “a primary motivation for some crimes, particularly theft, robbery, and 
burglary, is presumably that the [criminals] have little money of their own.” Id. at 1238. 
 117. Shavell recognizes that wealthier individuals may also commit crimes, and his argument is based 
on general tendencies. Id. at 1238 n.25. 
 118. Id. at 1238. 
 119. Id. at 1239. 
 120. He cites to murder, rape, and theft as examples of crimes that create a high amount of harm. 
Shavell, supra note 64, at 1239. 
 121. Id. 
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in which someone negligently causes harm.122 As to the first factor, 
he argues that it is more likely that the assets of the average tortfeasor 
are higher than the average criminal;123 so, monetary sanctions can 
work as an effective deterrent.124 As to the second, a tortfeasor is less 
likely to escape sanctions. Since she did not intend the harm, she is 
less likely to avoid or to try to avoid identification.125 Third, the 
benefits derived from a tort breach seem to be lower than a crime. 
The tortfeasor did not intend to commit the crime, so the only benefit 
gained would be the costs avoided in taking the appropriate safety 
measures.126 Finally, while the quantity of harm may be large (e.g., 
negligently causing someone’s death by car accident), the likelihood 
of occurrence is low.127 Again, this is because the person does not 
plan to commit the tort, so the likelihood of success would be less 
than if the person intended to cause the harm, as with the typical 
crime.128 
A.   Efficiency/Deterrence: Crime vs. Tort Breach 
Working from the above theories, the economic model can be 
reduced to two interconnected principles: deterrence and efficiency. 
The former is self-explanatory. Deterrence means preventing or 
limiting certain kinds of behavior. Criminal punishment would be 
more severe, or serve a greater deterrent role, than monetary 
sanctions.129 Efficient behavior represents economically valuable 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Id. 
 123. He specifically notes the large assets of corporate entities. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1240. Posner makes a similar point by arguing that “the affluent are kept in line, for the 
most part, by tort law.” Posner, supra note 8, at 1205. 
 125. Shavell explains that if the tortfeasor tries “to avoid identification (as when a driver who strikes a 
pedestrian leaves the scene of the accident), his act may be converted into a crime.” Shavell, supra note 
64, at 1239. 
 126. Id. at 1239–40. 
 127. Id. at 1240. 
 128. Shavell similarly finds that intentional torts, like defamation, are best deterred by monetary 
sanctions because the magnitude of the harm is much lower. Id. 
 129. Calabresi and Melamed say that criminal punishment, in lieu of monetary sanctions, serves as 
the “kicker” to prevent future attempts at converting property rules. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, 
at 1126. The implication here is that criminal punishment is a greater deterrent. Posner takes a similar 
position in acknowledging that criminal punishment, instead of monetary sanctions, would deter too 
much if used for tortious behavior. See generally Posner, supra note 8. Posner also talks about the 
stigma associated with criminal liability that is not present with tort damages. Id. at 1205. Again, the 
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behavior. It is behavior that improves the allocation of resources 
without making another person worse off.130 
Under the economic model, nonmonetary sanctions, such as 
imprisonment, are considered the optimal deterrence for crimes, 
whereas monetary damages are optimal for tort breaches. These 
respective sanctions suggest a different level of efficiency for torts 
and crimes. The underlying activity in a tort breach is more efficient, 
so it requires less deterrence. In contrast, the activity underlying a 
crime is less efficient, so it requires greater deterrence. 
Posner focuses on over-deterrence.131 For him, saddling tort 
violations with nonmonetary sanctions would curtail valuable 
economic activity. The calculus works the other way for crimes. 
Posner finds that crimes do not improve the allocation of resources. 
Therefore, it is important that this inefficient behavior is curtailed by 
more severe sanctions, such as criminal punishment, especially 
because most offenders will not be able to pay. 
Calabresi/Melamed and Shavell do not explicitly discuss the 
varying efficiencies of torts and crimes. Still, their respective 
conclusions on optimal deterrence suggest that torts represent less 
inefficient, or more efficient, behavior than crimes. Calabresi and 
Melamed explain that merely pricing criminal behavior after the fact 
would lead to greater inefficiency; more severe deterrence is 
necessary.132 This makes sense, since a crime, according to Calabresi 
and Melamed, constitutes an attempt to undermine a property rule or 
an efficient market transaction. On the other hand, liability rules that 
price the conduct after the fact can handle tort breaches without any 
                                                                                                                 
implication is that imprisonment is a more severe form of sanction than monetary damages, and thus, 
serves as a greater deterrent. Shavell does not rely on deterrence but focuses instead on the greater costs 
associated with imposing criminal punishment over civil sanctions. But, the implication here is that 
criminal punishment is the more severe sanction. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 1235. 
 130. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1094. Calabresi and Melamed say, “[m]ost versions 
of Pareto optimality are based on the premise that individuals know best what is best for them.” Id. at 
1094 n.10. Posner seems to adopt a similar definition by focusing on a market transaction as the epitome 
of an efficient transaction where an individual can negotiate an acceptable price for a particular good or 
service. See Posner, supra note 8, at 1195. Shavell does not focus on efficiency and, instead, relies on 
principles of utility in reaching his conclusions. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 1236–37. Still, one can 
infer this economic principle from his arguments. 
 131. See generally Posner, supra note 8. 
 132. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1125–26. 
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need for some additional “kicker” as in the criminal context. The 
inference here is that criminal conduct involves less efficient or 
economically valuable behavior than tortious conduct. Shavell 
reasons that the tort breaches are less likely to result in harm, confer 
less utility to the perpetrator, and are less likely to result in flight than 
are crimes.133 These factors lead him to conclude that cheaper 
monetary sanctions are sufficient for torts, and costly nonmonetary 
sanctions must be used for crimes.134 The inference here is that 
tortious behavior overall creates less disutility—thus, constitutes less 
inefficient conduct—than criminal behavior. 
This efficiency/deterrence relationship is best understood using 
Scenarios (1) and (2). The underlying behavior in Scenario (2) is 
economically good for society. We want to encourage individuals to 
frequent coffee shops and buy coffee. This type of consumer activity 
improves the allocation of resources—transfer of goods and money—
without making another worse off—both parties voluntarily 
transacted. If Scenario (2) were punished by nonmonetary sanctions, 
such as imprisonment, fewer individuals would engage in this 
behavior. People would be afraid that they might negligently knock 
over a computer when entering the shop. They may also take 
additional precautions that would be considered inefficient (e.g., only 
frequenting a coffee shop if no one inside has a computer).135 
The same economic-based argument applies to other negligent tort 
breaches. For instance, if we punish negligent automobile accidents 
with imprisonment, this would curtail driving—an activity that also 
has positive economic value. It generally facilitates the allocation of 
resources without harming others. Imposing criminal punishment 
may also prompt drivers to take additional inefficient precautions 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Shavell, supra note 64, at 1239–40. 
 134. Id. at 1240. In all fairness, this Article’s discussion of efficiency and deterrence more closely 
tracks Posner’s model than either Calabresi/Melamed’s or Shavell’s models. That said, to the extent 
Calabresi and Shavell would not endorse this Article’s efficiency/deterrence analysis, their models 
would still conclude that the optimal sanction for contract breaches would be monetary damages. For 
Calabresi, contract formation stands as the quintessential property rule. Shavell’s focus on the size a 
party’s assets and her ability to escape sanction would suggest that a contract breacher would be 
sufficiently deterred by monetary sanctions. 
 135. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1, 59 (2005) (punishing torts may encourage inefficient additional precautions). 
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(e.g., driving very slowly). The net effect here is the increase of 
inefficient activity. 
Some kind of sanction is still needed. Without any, individuals 
may be more likely to carelessly destroy computers or cause 
automobile accidents—i.e., there would be an increase in 
economically inefficient behavior.136 So, the optimal deterrence for 
Scenario (2) would be monetary damages. This sanction will make 
sure customers and drivers use the appropriate standard of care, 
without chilling economically valuable behavior or encouraging 
additional inefficient precautions. 
Scenario (1) works differently. This act of stealing a computer is 
inefficient and has no underlying economic value.137 It involuntarily 
denies a person their property and cannot improve the allocation of 
resources without making someone else worse off. This suggests a 
need for greater deterrence than what is required for Scenario (2). If 
we simply priced this type of criminal behavior, potential criminals—
who generally are not affluent—would not be discouraged from 
taking computers knowing that they would simply have to 
compensate the victim for the loss. Furthermore, putative victims 
would spend greater resources trying to protect their computers. So, 
the overall economic cost of pricing crimes would be high. More 
severe deterrence is necessary. Thus, criminal punishment serves as 
the optimal deterrence. This type of sanction discourages individuals 
from stealing computers. Over-deterrence or chilling efficient 
behavior is not a consideration—unlike with tort breaches—since this 
activity has no economic value. 
                                                                                                                 
 136. It is important to distinguish carelessly driving a car from driving a car. Only the latter would be 
economically valuable or efficient. 
 137. See infra Part II and accompanying notes. This notion of “economic value” or “efficiency” is not 
a simple utilitarian calculus, and thus, does not include the potentially beneficial consequences of a 
particular breach. It may turn out, for instance, that by stealing the computer, the perpetrator in Scenario 
(1) is able to create a computer program that revolutionizes the transfer of assets in a way that cuts costs 
dramatically. One might argue that this crime creates more good than harm. This overall utilitarian 
calculus is not relevant. The economic model is concerned with the nature of the breach itself and 
whether it involves efficient behavior. This instance of stealing would still constitute inefficient 
behavior, because the perpetrator took the computer without permission. To the extent a utilitarian 
calculus should be used here, it would not matter because this project seeks to understand these 
Scenarios with all else being equal. So, any positive result would equally apply to all Scenarios, and 
thus, would not serve as a distinguishing factor. 
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While the criminal must be in the coffee shop to steal the 
computer, this is not essential to the criminal act in the same way as 
negligently destroying the computer. The tortfeasor did not intend to 
destroy the computer when the individual frequented the coffee shop. 
So, it is hard to separate the tort—negligently destroying the 
computer—from the economically valuable activity—frequenting the 
coffee shop. Because the criminal knew what she was doing, she 
could have been in the coffee shop and not taken the computer (i.e. 
there is no problem with separating the crime from the economically 
valuable activity). The economic model thus seeks to prevent all 
instances of stealing a computer. 
Diagram A captures the inverse relationship between optimal 
deterrence and underlying efficiency. 
 
 
                           S1          
             
        





            S2 
    




The X-axis represents increasing underlying efficiency. As one 
moves left to right, the efficiency or economic value of the activity 
increases. The Y-axis represents increasing deterrence. Monetary 
sanctions would be considered low deterrence, whereas nonmonetary 
sanctions, such as imprisonment, would be considered high 
deterrence. The term “S1” represents Scenario (1), or the crime, and 
falls on the upper left. The term “S2” represents Scenario (2), or the 
tort breach, and falls on the lower right. 
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Deterrence and underlying efficiency are inversely related. The 
lower the efficiency—and the lower the economic value of the 
activity—the more deterrence is required. This makes sense from an 
economic point of view, where the goal is to increase overall 
efficiency. Because stealing the computer (S1) has low underlying 
efficiency, a greater level of deterrence is desired. This would 
decrease future crimes. Conversely, because negligently destroying 
the computer (S2) has higher underlying efficiency, lower deterrence 
is desired to ensure that the underlying activity is not completely 
curtailed. 
B.   The Efficiency/Deterrence of a Contract Breach 
Proponents of the economic model do not explicitly discuss 
contract breaches when analyzing the criminal/civil divide.138 
However, there is a wealth of scholarship on how economics explain 
the making and keeping of contracts, most of which is not relevant 
here.139 These scholars basically argue that contract making and a 
regime to enforce these agreements promotes overall efficiency.140 
This camp also finds that, sometimes, it is economically desirable to 
breach a contract.141 The doctrine of “efficient breach” encourages a 
person to breach a contract if she can compensate the other party and 
be better off than if she did not fully perform.142 This analysis, by and 
large, centers on the internal mechanics of contract law.143 This 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Calabresi and Melamed make references to contracts as part of their discussion of property rules 
but do not elaborate further on why these breaches receive civil sanctions. See Calabresi & Melamed, 
supra note 8, at 1106. 
 139. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
YALE L.J. 541 (2003). 
 140. See Schwartz, supra note 139, at 556; POSNER, supra note 13, § 4.10; Robert L. Birmingham, 
Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 291 
(1970). ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1 (1979) 
(noting that law and economics “may be able to tell us why people make contracts and how contract law 
can facilitate the operation of markets”). 
 141. RICHARD POSNER, supra note 13, § 4.10. 
 142. See supra note 13; see also Kraus, supra note 14, at 1649 n.6 (citing scholars who support the 
efficient breach principle). 
 143. There are certainly critiques of this economic analysis; they typically focus on the moral aspect 
of keeping promises. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 14. See generally Frank Menetrez, 
Consequentialism, Promissory Obligation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 47 UCLA L. REV. 859 
(2000). 
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Article’s focus, however, remains comparative.144 Still, this basic 
principle of efficiency that also underlies the economic model can 
explain why contract breaches are treated like tort breaches and only 
receive civil sanctions. 
Compare Scenarios (1) and (3). The underlying efficiencies of the 
two breaches are quite different. The forced transaction of Scenario 
(1) has no overall economic value, so society seeks to deter it 
completely. On the other hand, the underlying conduct in Scenario 
(3) was the formation of a contract, which has a high degree of 
economic value. A number of things typically go into this kind of 
transaction. Parties weigh their options and research potential buyers 
or sellers. Because both parties negotiate the terms of the deal and 
arrive at a mutually acceptable price, this transaction improves the 
allocation of resources without making another worse off. 
This free market transaction stands as the epitome of efficient 
market behavior. Indeed, this kind of contract formation typifies 
Posner’s idea of market transaction and Calabresi and Melamed’s 
property rule. Posner defines “market” as the system of “voluntary, 
compensated exchange.”145 Calabresi and Melamed’s concept of a 
“property rule” entails the sale of an entitlement “at the price at 
which [the seller] subjectively values the property.”146 These 
definitions are just another way of describing the exchange of goods 
or services via contract. 
The high level of efficiency in contract formation requires low 
deterrence when sanctioning a contract breach.147 The economic 
model seeks to encourage this kind of behavior just like the 
underlying conduct in a tort.148 Saddling contract breaches with 
criminal sanctions would chill economically valuable behavior.149 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Implicit in the notion of advocating for “efficient breaches” is that such breaches do not receive 
criminal punishment. Otherwise, it would not make sense to call them efficient. However, this notion 
accepts—without explaining why—such breaches, compared with their criminal counterparts, do not 
receive criminal punishment. 
 145. See Posner, supra note 8, at 1195. 
 146. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1105. 
 147. See Fellmeth, supra note 135, at 58–59. 
 148. See id. at 54. 
 149. See id. at 55. 
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Individuals would be discouraged from making contracts in fear that 
any resulting breach would land them in jail.150 The number of 
efficient market transactions would naturally decrease. This may 
explain why contract breaches also generally do not receive punitive 
damages.151 Like criminal punishment, this kind of heightened civil 
sanction could deter individuals from engaging in contract formation. 
This result is not economically desirable. Diagram B captures the 
efficiency/deterrence relationship of contract breaches relative to the 
other common law breaches. 
 
 
            S1 
  
Deterrence 
    
        
         S3’ 
          
      S3, S2 
       




Diagram B incorporates Diagram A with the addition of the 
contract breaches. Again, the X-axis represents increasing underlying 
efficiency, and the Y-axis represents increasing deterrence—from 
monetary sanctions on the low end to criminal punishment on the 
high end. The term “S3” represents Scenario (3), or the contract 
breach, and “S3’” represents Scenario (3’), or the case of fraudulent 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. 58–59 (explaining that contract breaches generally do not receive punitive damages 
because of the economic interest in not deterring efficient breaches); infra note 272. But see William S. 
Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999) (arguing that courts 
should impose punitive damages for all contract breaches, including efficient breaches). 
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inducement. S3 and S2 fall in the same location.152 Both of these 
breaches represent efficient underlying behavior that requires low 
deterrence. 
It may seem odd that these breaches (S2 and S3) receive the same 
treatment even though one is intentional-based conduct. This concept 
of intent certainly affects the analysis under the moral-based model 
(see infra Part IV). But the economic model relies on efficiency as 
the governing principle. Motives or intent do not directly play a 
role.153 What matters is to what extent the underlying conduct is 
considered efficient. Here, the underlying behavior in a contract 
breach or tort is more efficient than the underlying behavior in a 
crime, which explains why only crimes receive criminal punishment. 
C.   The Efficiency/Deterrence of Fraudulent Inducement 
Diagram B places Scenario (3’) to the left of Scenario (3). The 
former represents behavior that can be considered less efficient than a 
regular contract breach (S3), but still more efficient than a crime 
(S1). Breaches based on fraudulent inducement, like regular contract 
breaches, generally receive compensatory damages. Only an 
egregious instance of this type of fraud may trigger punitive 
damages, something ordinary contract breaches do not receive.154 
Punitive damages are defined as “damages, other than compensatory 
damages or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish 
him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him 
from similar conduct in the future.”155 The economic model can 
                                                                                                                 
 152. This Article does not make a conclusion as to which underlying activity, tort or contract, is more 
efficient, which is beyond the scope of the Article. It is enough to say that both represent more efficient 
behavior than their criminal counterpart. 
 153. Intent is relevant, but only to the extent it impacts the economic calculus. For Posner, the concept 
of “intent” can, among other things, help identify the forced transfer that bypass the marketplace. See 
Posner, supra note 8, at 1221. But, it is not intent qua intent that is doing the work; rather, it is the fact 
that the individual is purposely bypassing the market, and thus, engaging in inefficient behavior. 
Similarly, Shavell argues that intentional conduct is more likely to cause harm than unintentional 
conduct. See Shavell, supra note 64, at 1239. Again, the focus is on how the intentional conduct impacts 
the calculus, not the mere fact that the conduct was intentional. 
 154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979). 
 155. See id. 
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explain this heightened civil sanction. Here too, the issue remains 
deterrence and underlying efficiency.156 
The underling activity in Scenarios (3) and (3’) is similar. Both 
involved the voluntary formation of a contract, where the parties 
came to a mutually acceptable price. In short, both actions represent 
market transactions. Thus, it is fair to say that the underlying conduct 
in Scenario (3’) involves somewhat efficient behavior. 
However, there is a crucial difference between these two breaches. 
The buyer in Scenario (3’) made a false promise regarding the 
payment of $1,000. This dishonesty means that there was no true 
meeting of the minds. The victim was relying on an inaccurate 
representation when agreeing to sell the computer. At least with 
Scenario (3), the perpetrator initially intended to deliver the money. 
Therefore, it is hard to argue that Scenario (3’) represents a genuine 
market negotiation. Because one party was not fully aware of the 
defendant’s true intention, this transaction is less likely to allocate 
resources without making the other party worse off. This key 
difference explains why S3’ is not as efficient as S3 and falls to the 
left of S3 in Diagram B. 
Scenario (S3’) still represents conduct that remains much more 
efficient than S1, where the perpetrator just took the computer.157 The 
theft involved no negotiations whatsoever. There was no attempt at a 
meeting of the minds. For the economic model, this type of action 
would be the least efficient method for the transfer of goods and 
services. The fraudulent inducement was still part of a negotiation 
where the parties formed a contract. Even here, there remains some 
indicia of a voluntary transaction (and thus some indicia of 
efficiency), something that is completely absent in the criminal act. 
                                                                                                                 
 156. The analysis would be different if fraudulent inducement were considered a crime. See supra 
note 50. To explain why this type of action gets criminal punishment, the economic model would 
conclude that this conduct does not entail efficient behavior of any kind. In this way, it is very similar to 
the crime of larceny. 
 157. One might disagree with where S3’ is placed relative to S3 and S1. It could be argued that S3’ is 
not as close in efficiency to S3, so it should be placed more in the middle of Diagram B. Where along 
the efficiency/deterrence relationship this Scenario falls is not a concern of this Article. It is enough to 
say that conduct is not as efficient as S3 but more efficient than S1. That said, because only egregious 
instances of fraudulent inducement receive punitive damages, it makes sense that the conduct would fall 
closer to a regular contract breach. 
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The efficiency level of Scenario (3’), and its placement to the left 
of S3 but far to the right of S1 in Diagram B, explains the potential 
need for heightened deterrence in the form of punitive damages. 
These types of damages constitute something more than 
compensatory damages (reserved for regular contract breaches), but 
still within the confines of civil sanctions, and well below criminal 
punishment (reserved for crimes).158 This is consistent with the goals 
of the economic model. The economic model seeks to encourage the 
formation of contracts but discourage inducements based on fraud. 
Criminalizing breaches based on fraudulent inducement may deter 
too much. For instance, individuals who act in good faith may still 
not want to enter into certain contracts for fear that they might be 
criminally prosecuted for fraudulent inducement should they fail to 
satisfy their obligation under the agreement. But mere compensation 
may not always be enough. It may encourage lying and deceit in 
contractual promises. Thus, the economic model explains why 
society might impose punitive damages in select egregious instances. 
III. THE MORAL-BASED MODEL AND THE ROLE OF CULPABILITY 
The moral-based approach takes different forms and, like the 
economic model, has a long history.159 This Article focuses on three 
representative theories by Jerome Hall, Paul Robinson, and John 
Coffee.160 
Jerome Hall provides one of the earlier moral-based accounts of 
the distinction between criminal and civil liability.161 The crux of 
Hall’s argument is that criminal behavior—in contrast to tortious 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Cf. Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions, The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil 
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1803–04 (1992) (noting that punitive damages stand somewhere between 
compensatory damages and criminal punishment). 
 159. The moral-based understanding of criminal law traces its roots to Medieval and Greek scholars. 
See Hall, supra note 11, at 756–60 (cataloguing the history of the various ways scholars have 
distinguished criminal law based on moral principles). 
 160. See generally Coffee, supra note 10; Hall supra note 11; Jerome Hall, Interrelations of Criminal 
Law and Torts: II, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 967 (1943); Robinson, supra note 8. 
 161. See generally Hall, supra note 11. While Hall’s analysis predates Posner and 
Calabresi/Melamed, it can still be seen as a critique of the economic-based approach, which focuses on 
deterrence. 
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conduct—constitutes immoral or culpable behavior.162 He finds 
incomplete the arguments that simply focus on the varying utility of 
the sanctions imposed.163 What is missing, according to Hall, is 
understanding the reason for the respective sanctions, which requires 
focusing on the actual behavior and its moral status.164 This 
reasoning readily explains why only crimes receive criminal 
punishment. 
Hall begins by stating that every tort and crime constitutes a 
“harm” and that this harm is made up of two elements: “culpable 
conduct” and its “effects.”165 These elements together explain why 
torts receive civil sanctions and only crimes receive criminal 
punishment. Hall argues that, by and large, crimes, but not torts, 
involve culpable conduct.166 For Hall, “moral culpability” means a 
“value judgment” formulated in terms of “personal responsibility.”167 
Simply put, society finds crimes to be morally wrong.168 Hall relies 
on the notion of volitional conduct to explain this distinction.169 A 
criminal perpetrator intends to cause harm, a central feature of any 
crime.170 A tortfeasor, on the other hand, is merely negligent with no 
“intention” of causing harm.171 
Next, Hall turns to the second element of a breach, the “effects.”172 
This term simply refers to the resulting harm caused by the 
perpetrator’s conduct. Effects work differently for crimes and torts. 
Actual damages are necessary for the latter but are not essential to the 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Id. at 775–79. 
 163. See id. at 760–75. Hall spends a significant portion of his paper discussing the utilitarian model 
for explaining criminal punishment (based on deterrence) and its shortcomings. Hall, supra note 160, at 
999. 
 164. Hall, supra note 160, at 999. 
 165. Hall, supra note 11, at 760. 
 166. Id. at 775–79. 
 167. Id. at 775. 
 168. Hall, supra note 160, at 968. 
 169. Hall, supra note 11, at 777. 
 170. With regard to strict liability crimes, Hall ultimately concludes that “moral culpability should 
remain the essence of criminal liability,” and these strict liability violations should be re-evaluated. Hall, 
supra note 160, at 995–96. 
 171. Hall, supra note 11, at 778. Hall includes recklessness in his conception of “volitional conduct.” 
Id. What matters is that the perpetrator had knowledge that the conduct would cause harm. Id. at 778–
79. 
 172. Hall, supra note 160, at 967. 
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former.173 A tort, in fact, can produce more damage or harm than a 
crime.174 This is not problematic under Hall’s model. Regardless of 
the quantity of harm, the fact remains that the defendant’s conduct is 
not culpable (i.e. not intentional), thus explaining why she would not 
receive punishment.175 
Hall finds that a crime also produces harm, but calls it “social 
harm.”176 Unlike individual damages, a crime’s effect is not 
quantifiable, so it cannot be measured in money.177 It represents an 
overall harm to society, not an individual slight.178 Hall appeals to 
Blackstone’s original public/private dichotomy as a starting point.179 
He notes that a tort represents a private injury that is immaterial to 
the public.180 Crimes are different. They “strike at the very being of 
society” and represent public wrongs.181 
Hall spends a significant amount of time explaining the contours 
of “social harm,” the bulk of which is not relevant here.182 The 
important take-away is that social harm and culpability are both 
integral to Hall’s notion of a crime in a way that they are not with a 
tort breach.183 This analysis also explains why attempts to commit 
crimes receive criminal punishment. Even though they do not create 
any individual harm, these acts still represent culpable conduct that is 
an affront to society, i.e., the conduct causes social harm.184 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Id. at 969. Richard Epstein makes a similar point by noting that an “intention to harm” plays a 
central role in crimes, whereas actual damages plays a central role in the case of torts. Richard Epstein, 
Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, 
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231, 242 (John Hagel & Randy E. Barnett eds., 1977). 
 174. Hall, supra note 160, at 972. 
 175. Id. at 974. 
 176. Id. at 969. 
 177. Id. at 971. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Hall, supra note 11, at 757–58. 
 180. This notion explains why torts are prosecuted by individuals and not the state. Id 
 181. This difference explains why crimes are only prosecuted by the state at its discretion. Id. 
 182. Hall, supra note 160, at 967–79. 
 183. This combination of “culpability” and “social harm” also explains why intentional torts do not 
receive punishment. Id. While this conduct can be considered culpable, unlike crimes, intentional torts 
do not cause social harm; they only cause individual harm. Id. at 974–75. 
 184. Id. at 975. 
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Paul Robinson also presents a model based on moral 
considerations.185 He does not think that the efficiency based 
arguments of scholars like Posner and Shavell adequately explain the 
distinction between tort and criminal sanctions.186 Their focus on 
optimal deterrence, according to Robinson, does not capture the basic 
thrust of the two types of sanctions.187 They try to rationalize a 
system that is fundamentally based on emotion, not necessarily 
intellect.188 Robinson relies on the intuitive difference between these 
two sanctions to make his case. Simply put, criminal liability signals 
blameworthiness, whereas civil liability does not.189 
According to Robinson, the language used to describe these 
sanctions reflects this view.190 In the criminal context, we “speak of a 
‘crime’ rather than a ‘violation’ or a ‘breach,’ and of ‘punishment’ 
rather than of ‘remedy’ or ‘damages.’”191 These criminal-related 
terms carry the stamp of moral condemnation, whereas as the civil 
terms do not.192 For Robinson, this also explains why “consent 
generally is a defense in tort but not a defense to most crimes.”193 A 
plaintiff can vitiate their own right to recover damages, but a crime 
constitutes a wrong to society.194 So, individual consent cannot 
remove criminal liability. This also explains why fines are paid to the 
state and not the victim.195 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Robinson, supra note 8, at 206. 
 186. Id. at 204–05. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 209–10. Robinson appears to suggest that a cost-benefit analysis could be used but that it 
would have to carefully take into account society’s desire for moral condemnation. Id. at 212. 
 189. Robinson seems to imply that intentional torts, like their negligent counterparts, do not have the 
imprimatur of moral condemnation, and thus, only receive civil liability. Id. at 210 n.38. He suggests 
that punitive damages are most likely imposed in these cases where the harm caused is actually greater 
than that in a typical negligent breach. Id. 
 190. Id. at 205–06. 
 191. Robinson, supra note 8, at 206. 
 192. Id. Robinson cites the dictionary, which defines “criminal” as something “disgraceful” and 
“punishment” as retributive suffering. Id. 
 193. Id. at 207. 
 194. He distinguishes the case of a plaintiff, who may consent to discharge his right to recover 
damages, from the case of a suffering patient, who cannot remove criminal liability by consenting to 
allow her spouse to kill her. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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Robinson uses the case of a de minimis violation in the criminal 
context to bolster his point.196 A minor violation of criminal statutory 
law may avoid criminal liability but is no escape for civil liability.197 
Robinson cites to the relevant part of the Model Penal Code, which 
states, a “court shall dismiss a prosecution if . . . it finds that the 
defendant’s conduct . . . cause[d] or threaten[ed] the harm or evil 
sought . . . only to an extent too trivial to merit condemnation or 
conviction.”198 Robinson’s point is well taken. We do not punish 
every violation of the criminal code. Only those acts that violate 
some societal norm deserve punishment.199 However, all tort 
breaches can be prosecuted as long as the victim suffers some 
damage.200 
Robinson then asks why we need two systems at all.201 Would it 
not be more efficient to have one system that doles out punishment or 
damages, depending on the nature of the breach? In fact, given the 
great diversity of society and legal regimes, he thinks one would 
expect to see at least some structures that use a single criminal-civil 
system.202 The lack of such unified systems is meaningful to 
Robinson. He speculates that the human desire to make moral 
judgments is universal, and “there is practical value in giving formal 
legal expression to this human desire.”203 A distinct criminal system 
serves as the best way to express this sentiment. It provides a clear 
and simple mechanism for communicating moral condemnation.204 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Id. at 206. 
 197. Robinson, supra note 8, at 206. 
 198. Id. at 206 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12(2) (1985)). 
 199. Robinson makes clear that not “every norm violation gives rise to criminal liability.” Yet, 
“criminal liability cannot exist in the absence of a violation of a norm.” Id. 
 200. Id. Other scholars have also focused on the notion of deserving punishment. Jules Coleman 
argues that a tort simply requires a “state [to have] sufficient grounds for shifting a loss from” one party 
to the other. Jules Coleman, Crimes, Kickers, and Transaction Structures, in NOMOS XXVII: CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 313, 326 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1985). Criminal punishment, on the other hand, 
means loss of liberty, so society must be sure that this person deserves such sanction. This requires “an 
inquiry not only into what a person does, but his responsibility and guilt in having done it.” Id. 
 201. Robinson, supra note 8, at 207–08. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 207. 
 204. Specifically, 
[b]y creating a special criminal label and widely disseminating the notion that this label 
has a different, condemnatory meaning, the system enhances its ability to communicate a 
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John Coffee also endorses the concept of blameworthiness or 
moral condemnation as the distinctive quality of crimes compared to 
their tort counterparts.205 He begins with the premise that criminal 
sanctions serve a socializing force.206 Their purpose is to morally 
educate citizens.207 This purpose is distinct from tort sanctions, which 
are merely private sanctions that serve to price behavior. Civil 
sanctions “do nothing to reinforce a communitarian ethic or promote 
social bonding.”208 
Coffee explains that the stark contrast between the purpose of civil 
sanctions and criminal punishment turns on the existence or non-
existence of criminal intent.209 He finds that punishment is only 
appropriate where the individual knows that their behavior could be 
harmful to others.210 Without this mens rea, or state of mind, an 
individual does not require moral socialization, so the imposition of 
monetary sanctions is sufficient. 
Coffee recognizes that certain crimes are premised on strict 
liability or negligence.211 He finds that society may be better off by 
pricing this misbehavior, much like torts do.212 Coffee, in fact, is 
troubled by the expansion of the realm of criminal law: “behavior 
that was once considered merely tortious or a regulatory violation is 
now prosecuted as a crime.”213 He cites securities fraud and worker 
safety remedies as examples.214 Coffee believes that this blurring 
between tort and criminal law weakens the overall effectiveness of 
criminal law as a social control.215 He advocates for a greater role of 
                                                                                                                 
clear condemnatory message. Without a distinct criminal system, it would be more 
difficult to convey the message that some cases signal condemnation yet others do not. 
Id. at 208. 
 205. Coffee, supra note 10, at 235. 
 206. Id. at 223. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 225. 
 209. He recognizes that criminal behavior operates on a continuum, ranging from “the trivial to the 
egregious.” Still, the distinguishing factor between all of these crimes and any tort rests on the notion of 
criminal intent. Id. at 239. 
 210. Id. Coffee cites to case law to illustrate this level of intent. Id. 
 211. Coffee, supra note 10, at 228. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 238. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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intent to separate those actions that truly deserve criminal 
punishment from those that should merely receive monetary 
compensation.216 
A. Culpability: Crime vs. Tort Breach 
The moral-based model relies on the notion of culpability or 
blameworthiness to explain the differing treatment of crimes and 
torts. The concept of blameworthiness is tied up with intentional 
conduct. If a person intends to cause harm, the resulting act merits 
condemnation and thus criminal punishment. On the other hand, if 
the person was merely careless, these actions do not suggest ill 
motive, so they do not have the imprimatur of moral condemnation. 
Thus, it makes little sense to criminally punish this conduct, even if it 
causes the same or greater harm. 
Hall focuses on the intentional nature of criminal behavior and its 
resulting culpability.217 Robinson relies on the intuitive moral 
condemnation associated with a criminal violation.218 While he does 
not explicitly state a criminal violation requires intentional conduct, 
this seems to be the inference and would explain why society 
associates terms like “violation” or “punishment” with criminal acts 
but “damages” or “remedy” with tort breaches. Coffee also relies on 
the intentional nature of criminal behavior as the distinctive quality 
that explains why such breaches receive criminal punishment.219 
The moral-based approach adequately explains the differing 
treatment of Scenarios (1) and (2). Scenario (1) is criminally 
punished because the perpetrator intended to take the computer. 
Scenario (2), however, does not receive such sanctions because the 
person was merely careless in destroying the computer, and thus, had 
no intention of destroying the property. Diagram C graphically 
represents this relationship. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Id. at 193. He finds that the best way to implement these changes is at the sentencing stage. Id. at 
24–45. 
 217. Hall, supra note 11, at 775–79. 
 218. Robinson, supra note 8, at 205–06. 
 219. Coffee, supra note 10, at 235. 
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Diagram C incorporates Diagram A with the addition of a Z-axis, 
representing an increasing level of moral culpability. As the level of 
“intent” increases, so does the culpability.220 The tort and crime stand 
as polar opposites. The tort breach (S2) falls on the lower end of the 
continuum, suggesting no culpability, because the perpetrator did not 
intend to destroy the computer. The crime (S1) falls on the upper end, 
suggesting a high degree of culpability, because the perpetrator 
purposefully took the computer. 
Extrapolating from this relationship, one could imagine that a 
breach based on “recklessness” would represent a level of culpability 
somewhere between these two extremes. Here, the perpetrator would 
have exhibited a “conscious disregard of, or indifference to, [the] risk 
[of harm].”221 We can imagine a defendant who is severely 
intoxicated and enters the coffee shop and knocks down the 
                                                                                                                 
 220. Here, “intent” means the state of mind of the perpetrator in a common law breach. Intent or 
purpose is considered the most serious mental state, followed in descending order by knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence. See 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 5.1 (2d ed. 2010); Kenneth Simons, Rethinking 
Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463 (1992). 
 221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 cmt. a (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS § 2 (2010) (focusing on the knowledge of the defendant and finding that recklessness entails that 
“the [defendant] knows of the risk of harm created by the conduct or knows facts that make the risk 
obvious to another in the person’s situation.”). 
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computer. This breach is still treated as a tort, but such action may 
trigger punitive damages.222 The moral-based theory can explain this 
result. Recklessly destroying the computer is morally worse than 
negligently destroying it. The reckless actor was aware of what could 
happen in a way that the negligent defendant was not. This 
heightened awareness suggests a greater culpability.223 Still, the 
reckless defendant remains less culpable than the defendant who 
intentionally took the computer. Graphically, the former act would 
fall somewhere between S1 and S2 on the culpability continuum. 
This placement explains why this kind of action would receive 
punitive damages, which are greater than compensatory damages but 
less than criminal punishment. Under the moral-based model, 
punitive damages can be seen as a device for expressing moral 
condemnation, just not as strong as the condemnation associated with 
criminal punishment.224 
Diagram C combines both the economic and moral-based models. 
In this way, the crime (S1) stands as the morally blameworthy action 
and also the one that is least efficient, requiring the greatest 
deterrence. Conversely, the tort breach (S2) triggers no moral 
condemnation. Its underlying conduct is also efficient and requires 
the least deterrence. Diagram C does not make any causal claims. For 
instance, the crime does not receive the highest deterrence because of 
its moral blameworthiness or vice versa (this analysis is beyond the 
scope of the Article). Still, these correlations make some sense. It 
stands to reason that the most culpable conduct would also merit the 
most deterrence. On the other hand, conduct with no stamp of moral 
culpability would merit the least deterrence. 
                                                                                                                 
 222. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (2010) (“While a showing of negligence generally 
suffices for compensatory damages, the standard for awarding punitive damages commonly refers to the 
defendant’s reckless conduct—or reckless indifference to risk, or reckless disregard for risk.”). 
 223. Hall makes a similar point in the criminal context, when explaining that recklessness may 
constitute volitional conduct worthy of moral condemnation. See Hall, supra note 160, at 982. 
 224. Under the moral-based position, punitive damages can be seen as a device for expressing moral 
condemnation, just not as strong as the condemnation associated with criminal punishment. See, e.g., 
Richardson, supra note 8, at 114 (“Punitive damages are a conventional device for expressing 
condemnation. However, the relative strength of that condemnation is weak compared to the 
condemnation expressed by the criminal sanction. Punitive damages carry neither the possibility of 
imprisonment nor the collateral consequences of criminal punishment.”). 
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A similar correlation exists with the reckless breach described 
earlier. As slightly more culpable than the negligent breach, it stands 
to reason that it would also constitute slightly less efficient behavior. 
The reckless perpetrator had heightened knowledge that her actions 
could destroy the computer. So, imposing punitive damages could be 
the appropriate deterrence. This would not chill valuable economic 
activity (frequenting coffee shops) because the perpetrator—unlike 
his negligent counterpart—was aware of the risks. This larger 
monetary sanction would simply deter this individual from getting 
drunk when frequenting coffee shops, not from frequenting coffee 
shops. Still, because this behavior would not be as inefficient as 
intentionally taking the computer, criminal punishment would be 
inappropriate and constitute too great a deterrence. 
The economic and moral-based scholars seem to recognize the 
interplay between the two approaches. Posner, for instance, states 
that the moral-based approach may have some “normative merit[],” 
but the fact remains that economics provides the superior theory for 
understanding criminal punishment.225 Calabresi and Melamed also 
seem to suggest that some entitlements can be explained by moral 
principles but that efficiency considerations provide the more 
persuasive explanation.226 These statements at least suggest that the 
two approaches can be viewed together in a consistent matter. The 
same recognition holds true for the advocates of the moral-based 
model. Hall, for instance, focuses on origins of the punishment but 
recognizes that the type of punishment flows from this original 
determination of culpability.227 Robinson too suggests that the two 
models positively correlate. He simply finds that the economic 
approach does not recognize the “fundamental differences in [the] 
purposes and goals” of criminal and civil sanctions.228 
                                                                                                                 
 225. Posner, supra note 8, at 1230–31 (“Although judges and legislators do not often speak the 
language of economics, this Article suggests that they often do reason implicitly in economic terms and 
that economic analysis is, therefore, helpful in explaining the basic structure of law, including criminal 
law.”). 
 226. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1105. 
 227. Hall, supra note 160, at 1000. 
 228. Robinson, supra note 8, at 205. 
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B.   Integrating the Economic and Moral-Based Models 
Some scholars go further and explicitly argue that both approaches 
must be used in order to persuasively explain the distinction between 
criminal and civil sanctions.229 
Alvin Klevorick uses Posner’s and Calabresi/Melamed’s economic 
models as starting points.230 However, he finds that these theorists 
must first posit a political and moral foundation of society before 
engaging in a law and economic analysis of civil and criminal 
liability.231 For Klevorick, any discussion of efficient behavior and 
market forces presupposes something he coins a “transaction 
structure.”232 Society has created this structure, which “sets out the 
terms or conditions under which particular transactions or exchanges 
are to take place.”233 This structure embodies a particular society’s 
values, including a description of its actual moral, political, and legal 
commitments.234 He goes on to say that the sanctions we place on 
certain acts—e.g., criminal punishment or monetary damages—
reflect efforts to enforce this structure.235 He gives special attention 
to the moral aspect of society’s transaction structure, citing Hall’s 
emphasis on culpability and moral condemnation.236 Klevorick 
concludes that this type of moral judgment informs any subsequent 
economic analysis. If we morally condemn an act such as a crime this 
will alter how we perform any cost-benefit analysis resulting from 
such behavior.237 
Similarly, Dau-Schmidt focuses on both economic and moral 
principles to explain the existence of criminal sanctions.238 He begins 
by positing a model that focuses on shaping the preferences of 
individuals when they deviate from established norms.239 This 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8; Klevorick, supra note 8. 
 230. Klevorick, supra note 8, at 907–08. 
 231. Id. at 909. 
 232. Id. at 908. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Klevorick, supra note 8, at 917. 
 237. Id. at 918. 
 238. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 8, at 3. 
 239. Id. at 26. 
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“preference-shaping theory” serves to promote adherence to these 
norms through criminal punishment. It targets individuals whose 
“actions indicate that [they] intended or desired to bring about the 
proscribed harm.”240 Accordingly, it makes no sense to punish those 
individuals that are negligent, because their actions do not indicate 
deviant preferences—they did not intend to contravene social 
norms.241 
What sets Dau-Schmidt’s theory apart from the traditional 
economic model is how criminal punishment shapes preferences. 
While he notes the straightforward economic value of deterrence, 
Dau-Schmidt goes one step further.242 He finds that this punishment 
also represents “an expression of society’s condemnation of the 
criminal act.”243 This moral dimension is crucial to understanding the 
purpose of criminal law. 
Revisiting Diagram C, Klevorick and Dau-Schmidt would 
probably say that it is no coincidence that the crime places high on 
the moral condemnation line and low on the efficiency continuum. 
Criminal punishment represents an expression of both these 
economic and moral opinions. Similarly, both of these principles 
inform society’s decision to impose only civil sanctions for tort 
breaches. So, it makes sense that these breaches are low on the moral 
condemnation line and high on the efficiency scale. 
Again, this Article’s aim is not to argue for any specific causal 
relationship. Does the moral condemnation suggest the lower 
economic efficiency, and thus, the greater deterrence? Or, is it the 
other way around? The point here is that these two approaches can be 
seen as part of a single integrated system expressing society’s social 
structure and related mores. 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. 
 241. Dau-Schmidt argues that an “opportunity shaping” model provides the better mechanism for 
tortfeasors. Id. at 23. By imposing only monetary sanctions at the discretion of individual members, this 
policy simultaneously creates incentives for good behavior and provides a means to compensate victims. 
Id. at 22–23. 
 242. Id. at 36–37. 
 243. Id. at 37. 
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IV. CONTRACT BREACHES AND THE ROLE OF CULPABILITY 
Contract breaches are generally not part of the greater discussion 
on moral judgments and the criminal/civil divide. Hall briefly 
discusses contract making and distinguishes it from torts and 
crimes.244 He explains that torts and crimes just forbid certain 
actions, whereas contractual duties arise only after certain affirmative 
conduct.245 The discussion ends there. He then moves on to 
explaining the tort/crime distinction without further reference to 
contracts.246 
Robinson also makes a brief reference to contracts when 
discussing the notion of culpability.247 He argues “[b]reaking a 
contract . . . may be conduct that we seek to discourage and may . . . 
justify compensation of an injured party, but such conduct does not 
necessarily carry the moral blameworthiness . . . implicit in [a] 
criminal conviction.”248 Interestingly, he does not elaborate further. 
Why do contract breaches not share the moral condemnation of 
crimes? A contract breach appears to mimic the contours of a 
criminal act. Both are intentional and purposeful behavior that can 
cause the same harm. 
Many scholars, in fact, have incorporated the notion of moral 
obligation into their understanding of contract formation. Immanuel 
Kant’s famous categorical imperative appeals to promise-making as a 
paradigmatic example of following the moral law.249 Scholars like 
Charles Fried have gone on to argue that a contract represents a 
moral responsibility to fulfill the terms of the contract.250 Fried 
argues that that a contract corresponds to an underlying moral 
promise and that contract law serves as society’s enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
 244. See generally Hall, supra note 11. 
 245. Id. at 755. 
 246. Id. at 756–60. 
 247. Robinson, supra note 8, at 206. 
 248. Id. at 206. 
 249. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39–40 (Lewis Beck trans.) 
(1959). Kant maintains that if a single person’s act of not fulfilling a promise were made into a universal 
law (everyone made promises only to break them) contracting would be impossible. Id. 
 250. Fried, supra note 14; Kraus, supra note 14, at 1604 (discussing the correspondence account of 
contract making). 
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mechanism of this promise.251 More recent scholars have argued that 
contract law should recognize this underlying moral obligation or 
promise.252 This stands in sharp opposition to the economic 
scholars—and their notion of efficient breach—who argue that 
sometimes breaching a contract is the economically right thing to 
do.253 But again, the discussion centers on the internal mechanics of 
contract law.254 The purpose of this Article is to explain why contract 
breaches receive the same treatment as tort breaches. That said, it 
would seem that understanding contracts as moral obligations 
bolsters the conclusion that under the moral-based model, a contract 
breach—much like a crime—constitutes culpable conduct worthy of 
moral blame. 
A. The Culpability of a Contract Breach 
It is hard to see how the moral-based model can differentiate 
between Scenario (3) and Scenario (1) in terms of culpability. In both 
cases, the perpetrator intentionally caused the same type of harm, 
namely the loss of a computer. Neither was mistaken or careless. 
This behavior stands in stark contrast to Scenario (2) where the 
perpetrator did not intend to destroy the computer. This suggests that 
the contract breach also deserves moral blame, and thus, criminal 
punishment. 
                                                                                                                 
 251. Fried, supra note 14, at 1 (“The promise principle, which in this book I argue is the moral basis 
of contract law, is that principle by which persons may impose on themselves obligations where none 
existed before.”). 
 252. See generally Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 
(2007) (discussing the divergence between the legal requirements/consequences of a contract breach and 
the moral requirements/consequences of a breaking a promise); DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO 
CONTRACT: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT 89–115 (2003). But see Michael Pratt, 
Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 801 (2008) (arguing that contracts do not constitute 
promises); see also Kraus, supra note 14, at 1648 n.3 (citing scholars). 
 253. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1649 n.6 (citing scholars supporting efficient breach principle); 
supra Part II.B. and accompanying notes. 
 254. Shiffrin does suggest (albeit briefly) that the moral nature of the respective breaches explains 
why torts and crimes “levy penalties” but contract breaches do not. Shiffrin, supra note 252, at 737. 
Contract breaches involve a breach of trust, while torts/crimes involve a breach of physical security. Id. 
at 738–39. It is not clear what “penalties” mean here, as only crimes receive criminal punishment. 
Moreover, Shiffrin seems to assume that a tort or crime causes a different type of harm than a contract 
breach. It is unclear what this means or how this distinction helps here, particularly where the Scenarios 
articulated above all cause the same harm. 
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The voluntariness of this transaction does not readily seem to alter 
this analysis. Recognizing that the perpetrator could have avoided 
entering into the contract does not, in any way, mitigate the resulting 
breach. If anything, the moral-based model suggests this person is 
more culpable because she intentionally broke a promise that she 
chose to undertake and could fulfill. On the other side, it is not the 
victim’s fault that the contract was breached. It is counterintuitive to 
suggest that the victim was somehow responsible for entering into the 
contract, and this fact now vitiates the need for criminal punishment. 
Indeed, in the criminal context, a victim’s conduct does not generally 
play a part in determining whether criminal punishment should be 
imposed. In Scenario (1), it may have been unadvisable for the victim 
to go to the bathroom, but no one would suggest that this act absolves 
the perpetrator of criminal liability.255 Any argument based on 
voluntariness needs more explanation (see infra Part V). 
Perhaps, the focus should be on the role that intent plays in a crime 
as compared to a tort or contract breach. Under the moral-based 
model, culpability is central to a crime in a way that it is not with a 
tort breach. Hall explains that “the immorality of the actor’s conduct 
is essential” to a crime, whereas “moral culpability is of secondary 
importance in tort law.”256 
Understood in this way, a contract breach would be more akin to a 
tort breach. Neither requires intentional conduct. A person is liable if 
she fails to take the appropriate duty of care or fails to fulfill her 
                                                                                                                 
 255. The case of provocation or heat of passion defense bolsters this point. Here, the defendant argues 
that the victim somehow provoked the conduct, usually in the context of a homicide. Lizama v. United 
States Parole Comm’n, 245 F.3d 503, 506 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932 
(10th Cir. 1987); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985) (describing manslaughter as “a homicide 
which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse”). While this may lessen the defendant’s 
punishment, it will not absolve the defendant of all potential criminal liability. Appealing to the notion 
of consent also does not provide a persuasive answer. First, it seems counterintuitive to argue that the 
victim of a contract breach consented in some way to the resulting breach. She entered the contract 
expecting satisfication of the contractual terms. Moreover, in the criminal context, while a person may 
consent to activity that may otherwise be unlawful (e.g. fighting in a boxing match), this individual also 
absolves the perpetrator of any civil liability. Thus, relying on consent in the contract breach to explain 
the lack of criminal punishment would lead to the unintended conclusion that the breacher should also 
not be liabile for civil damages. 
 256. Hall, supra note 160, at 971. 
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obligations under a contract. In fact, a contract breach does not 
require a reasonable duty of care. The legal standard is strict liability. 
With Scenario (3), it is irrelevant that the perpetrator intentionally 
breached the contract. The only thing that counts is that she did not 
pay the money (i.e. she did not perform under the contract). So, while 
this breach constitutes culpable behavior, this fact is of secondary 
importance to the actual harm caused. 
This argument does not have much persuasive appeal. The fact 
remains that both perpetrators in Scenarios (1) and (3) intended to 
deprive the victim of the value of the computer. Thus, it seems 
somewhat facile to say that the perpetrator in Scenario (3) is not 
culpable, or otherwise not deserving of criminal punishment, simply 
because intent is not a legal element of a contract breach. Indeed, the 
purpose of the moral-based account is to explain the legal regime, not 
the other way around. This view means morally judging the actual 
conduct, not the formal requirements. The varying legal standards—
strict liability versus intent—seem to follow from the criminal/civil 
divide, not explain it. Society legally requires intent with crimes 
because this conduct is criminally punished. On the other hand, 
because contract breaches only receive civil sanctions, intent is not as 
important. 
Focusing on intent makes sense when comparing criminal and tort 
breaches. In Scenario (2), the negligent tortfeasor cannot 
intentionally cause the destruction of the computer. The crux of this 
tort is its non-intentional nature. This explains why this individual 
cannot be culpable and why society does not impose criminal 
punishment. But the perpetrator in Scenario (3) purposefully 
withholds the money even though she has the ability to pay. 
Regardless of the legal requirements, this person’s behavior would 
seem to trigger the same moral judgment as the criminal counterpart, 
suggesting the imposition of criminal sanctions. 
B. The Culpability of Fraudulent Inducement 
Relying on intent to distinguish crimes from contract breaches 
becomes more problematic when examining Scenario (3’). Intent is 
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equally relevant here as with a crime. Fraudulent inducement legally 
requires a defendant to intentionally make a false representation as to 
a future act on which the other party relies.257 So, if the criminal act 
is morally blameworthy, it is hard to see why the fraudulent 
inducement would not also be so.258 
Maybe, the emphasis should be on individual damages. Damages 
play an important role in a fraudulent inducement claim, much like in 
a tort or normal contract breach.259 Hall makes a similar point when 
discussing the difference between “social harm” and “individual 
damages.”260 With both Scenarios (3) and (3’), if the perpetrator 
returned the money, for all practical purposes there would be no 
cause of action. This is different from Scenario (1). Even if the 
computer were returned to the victim, the defendant would still be 
criminally liable and subject to punishment. But, this emphasis on 
damages does not explain why only crimes trigger criminal 
punishment. In other words, does society criminalize Scenario (1) 
because damages are not necessary to make out a criminal act? The 
corollary would be that society does not criminalize the other 
Scenarios because damages are integral to making out a breach. This 
approach does not have significant persuasive appeal. The moral-
based theory still needs to explain how the requirement of individual 
harm or damages provides the key to understanding the civil/criminal 
divide. 261 In fact, it seems the causal relationship works the other 
way around. The requirement of damages follows from society’s 
decision not to criminalize torts and contracts rather than explaining 
it. It is precisely because society finds crimes morally worse than 
torts that damages are integral to the latter but not the former. Where 
                                                                                                                 
 257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981). 
 258. Perhaps, this partly explains why some jurisdictions have criminalized this type of fraud. But this 
criminalization is certainly not universal a practice, so an explanation is still necessary as to why such 
behavior is not criminal in certain jurisdictions where larceny remains a crime. 
 259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977); 23 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:1 (4th 
ed. 2010). 
 260. See supra Part III and accompanying notes. 
 261. Hall’s distinction between social harm and individual damages is also not particularly helpful. 
The moral-based account must still explain why the harm involved in the crime constitutes social harm, 
while the harm involved in the tort or contract breach constitutes individual damages. In the three 
Scenarios, in fact, the harm appears to be the same, namely the loss of the value of the computer. 
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does that leave contract breaches? On the one hand, individual 
damages are integral for civil liability, suggesting a similarity with 
torts. But this behavior is also intentional and purposeful, much like a 
crime. 
C. Contract Breaches and the Moral-Based/Economic Models 
The moral-based approach has merit. However, a more nuanced 
analysis is required. A good start would be to understand how the 
economic and moral models work, or do not work, together when 
examining contract breaches. 
 
 
       S1 
         
    
Deterrence          Moral Culpability 
        
   S3’ 
        
              S3, S2 
        




Diagram D incorporates Diagram B with the addition of the Z-
axis, representing the increasing moral culpability of the individual 
breach. Again, Scenario (2) falls on the low end of this line because 
the breach does not involve intentional conduct, whereas Scenario (1) 
falls on the upper end because the breach was intentional. These 
locations correlate with the economic principles of efficiency and 
deterrence. 
Scenarios (3) and (3’) do not fit in the same way. The economic 
model places both of these breaches in the lower right quadrant, 
indicating relatively efficient behavior that requires low deterrence. 
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S3’ falls to the left and above of S3 (indicating less efficient 
behavior) but still a significant distance from S1. These locations 
imply that both types of contract breaches are relatively low on the 
culpability continuum and do not constitute conduct worthy of moral 
condemnation.262 Yet, the moral-based approach suggests the 
contrary, namely that these breaches are on par with crimes.263 
Likewise, they constitute intentional-based conduct that merits equal 
blame. But, if these breaches are placed on the upper end of the 
culpability continuum with S1, this suggests that these acts have a 
low efficiency and require high deterrence. So, it seems that the 
moral-based and economic models do not positively correlate when 
explaining contract breaches. 
The logical conclusion is that one of the models is not accurately 
classifying these breaches. The problem rests with the moral-based 
approach, at least as it stands. Something more is required to explain 
the unique nature of contract breaches. What is missing is 
distinguishing the concept of a non-voluntary obligation from a 
voluntary obligation. 
V. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF CONTRACTS: VOLUNTARY OBLIGATIONS 
VS. NON-VOLUNTARY OBLIGATIONS 
The underlying responsibility in a contract breach has a profoundly 
different structure than the underlying responsibility in a tort or a 
crime. The Article distinguishes here between a “voluntary 
obligation” and a “non-voluntary obligation.”264 Non-voluntary 
                                                                                                                 
 262. While the economic model finds that S3’ is less efficient than S3, this model still finds that S3’ is 
far more efficient than S1, suggesting that S3’ constitutes conduct that is far less culpable than S1. 
 263. Because S3’ involves deceit, the moral-based model would probably find that this conduct is 
more culpable than S3 or the regular contract breach. 
 264. These terms and their respective definitions generally track Jody Kraus’ recent distinction 
between “moral duty” and “moral obligation.” See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1613–15; see also Michael 
Pratt, Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 26 LAW & PHIL. 531, 533 (2007). Kraus’ focus, 
however, is on the normative, moral nature of contract breaches. He follows scholars like Fried who are 
interested in exploring the underling moral responsibilities of contract formation. Kraus uses this 
distinction for the purposes of exploring the notion of personal sovereignty in making promises (none of 
which is relevant here). See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1606–09. This Article is not particularly interested 
in the debate about the relationship between moral obligations and legal responsibilities. See, e.g., 
Patricia White, Law and Moral Obligation, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (1982) (discussing the difference 
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obligations are responsibilities that are already in place, and as a 
member of society, each person is automatically subject to them.265 
They exist independent of any individual action, and thus, are not 
self-imposed. A non-voluntary obligation represents the underlying 
responsibility in a tort or crime. With a voluntary obligation, on the 
other hand, a person chooses to take on this obligation with another 
person. Unlike non-voluntary obligations, without taking some 
affirmative action with another individual, a person is not subject to 
these voluntary obligations.266 A voluntary obligation represents the 
underlying responsibility in a contract breach. 
A.   The Elements of a Contract Breach and Criminal/Tort Breach 
The basic elements of a crime and tort point to a non-voluntary 
obligation, whereas the elements of a contract breach suggest a 
voluntary obligation. A prima facie tort requires a breach of a duty of 
care. An individual must fail to exercise a reasonable level of care as 
defined by the circumstances.267 This duty is not triggered by any 
voluntary action. All members of society are bound by it.268 In this 
way, the perpetrator in Scenario (2) was responsible for using the 
appropriate level of care when the individual frequented the coffee 
shop. This duty did not arise from voluntary action or agreement. By 
this person’s very presence in the coffee shop, she had a duty not to 
negligently destroy the computer.269 
The same notion of non-voluntary obligation is perhaps more 
obvious in a crime. Most people think of criminal laws simply as 
                                                                                                                 
between natural law scholars, such as Thomas Aquinas, who find a relationship between legal duties and 
moral duties and positivist scholars, such as John Austin, who deny any such essential relationship). 
This Article’s focus is on the unique nature of the actual legal responsibility arising from contract law 
compared with the legal responsibility arising from tort or criminal law. 
 265. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1614. 
 266. See id. at 1616. 
 267. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS §§ 3, 7 (2010). 
 268. A perpetrator may cite to the contributory negligence of the plaintiff to avoid liability, but this is 
an affirmative defense where the defendant has technically already breached the level of care. See id. § 3 
cmt. b. 
 269. One might argue that this duty arose voluntarily, in so far as the perpetrator entered the coffee 
shop willingly. This is certainly true but misses the point. There is no doubt the nature of the duty will 
depend on the circumstances (e.g. driving, entering a coffee shop). Short of the specific environment, 
however, the individual has no choice in the matter on whether to take on the duty. 
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rules that we all must follow. These duties are automatic; they are not 
assumed voluntarily. Take again Scenario (1). The perpetrator had a 
legal duty not to take the computer. Like its tort counterpart, this duty 
does not arise because this person did or did not do something. The 
perpetrator, as a member of society, is simply bound by this duty. 
While both breaches signify non-voluntary obligations, this does 
not mean that these obligations are made the same. A crime receives 
punishment whereas a tort breach receives civil sanctions. This 
conclusion is not problematic. There is no reason to think all non-
voluntary obligations must be treated the same. One would not 
expect this to be the case. Society can decide that some actions are 
worse than others. In fact, this is exactly what the moral-based model 
does with torts and crimes. It is worse to intentionally take a 
computer, violating a criminal non-voluntary obligation, than to 
negligently destroy it, violating a tort non-voluntary obligation. This 
explains the differing treatment of these breaches. 
A contract breach works differently. Here both parties must agree 
to the terms. Simply put, there is no contract if the individuals do not 
voluntarily undertake their respective responsibilities with the other 
person.270 The underlying obligation is self-imposed. The contract 
breacher in Scenario (3) was not automatically obligated to deliver 
the money. She chose to buy a computer and to take on the 
corresponding voluntary obligation of paying for it. The victim, too, 
had to agree to the terms of the contract. For instance, the victim in 
Scenario (3) could have refused to sell the computer to the 
perpetrator. No contract would have been formed and there would 
have been no corresponding voluntary obligation. 
Scenario (3’) works the same way. Again, the legal responsibility 
of delivering the money is voluntarily undertaken with another 
person. A breach, based on fraudulent inducement, requires the 
perpetrator to make a representation regarding her end of the deal, 
albeit a false representation, and the victim to agree to it. Without 
these voluntary actions, there is no legal responsibility or obligation 
to fulfill the terms of the contract. 
                                                                                                                 
 270. See generally supra Part I.A. 
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B.   The Moral-Based Model: A Redux 
With this distinction, this Article revisits the moral-based 
approach. As explained earlier, this approach focuses on the 
culpability of the act—its intentional nature—to explain why only 
crimes receive criminal punishment. The problem, though, is 
explaining contract breaches, particularly breaches based on 
fraudulent inducement, both of which also appear to involve culpable 
conduct. 
The voluntary/non-voluntary obligation distinction can help here. 
Contract breaches may constitute culpable conduct, but the 
underlying responsibility is different from the underlying 
responsibility in a tort or a crime. Contractual obligations constitute 
voluntary conduct where both parties agree to the terms of the 
bargain.271 On the other hand, a non-voluntary obligation to obey a 
criminal or tort law is always in place. Society is the source of this 
obligation. No individual action is required. The qualitatively 
different nature of these two responsibilities explains the varying 
treatment of their corresponding legal breaches. 272 
Society does not have as great of an interest in policing a voluntary 
obligation compared to its non-voluntary obligation counterpart. A 
non-voluntary obligation can be viewed as a direct affront to 
society’s established precepts. It is a duty owed directly to society, 
making any violation particularly significant.273 On the other hand, a 
voluntary obligation—because it does not flow from society itself—
does not carry the same importance. It is better understood as a 
responsibility directly owed to the individual with whom the 
obligation was undertaken. This voluntary/non-voluntary obligation 
                                                                                                                 
 271. This notion of both parties voluntarily acting to create a voluntary obligation can help explain the 
theory behind why a contractual legal responsibility requires more than just a promise by one person. 
See, e.g., Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (arguing that 
consent of other the party creates the necessary legal obligation). 
 272. Kraus makes a similar point when explaining why contract breaches do not receive punitive 
damages. See Kraus, supra note 14, at 1641. He finds that because these contract breaches correlate with 
what he calls “moral obligations,” not “moral duties,” it is not surprising that society does not generally 
impose punitive damages. Id. 
 273. This idea does not mean, of course, that society would punish all non-voluntary obligations. As 
explained above, society may weigh certain violations (intentional conduct) as morally worse than 
others (negligent conduct). 
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distinction better captures the public/private distinction discussed 
above.274 Because a non-voluntary obligation is owed to society 
directly, the resulting tort or crime can be viewed as a public injury. 
Because a voluntary obligation is an obligation owed to a person, the 
resulting contract breach can be viewed as a private injury. 
Put another way, society does not regulate the substance of 
voluntary obligations. It is only interested in how these obligations 
are created and subsequently breached, not what these obligations 
happen to be.275 In this way, contract law involves rules that dictate 
the manner by which these responsibilities are created and the 
consequences of their breach. Contracts require mutual assent and 
consideration. A breach occurs when the obligation is not fulfilled. 
None of these rules regulates the substance of the terms of the 
contract. These rules do not prescribe or require specific obligations. 
For instance, the law does not require that a contract must involve a 
reasonable price, a specific time for delivery, or a certain type of 
exchange.276 Individuals are generally free to create contracts about 
whatever they choose.277 In other words, they bargain or negotiate the 
substance of the voluntary obligation that they undertake. In both 
Scenarios (3) and (3’), for instance, the perpetrator and victim agreed 
upon the terms, which included paying a certain amount for the 
computer. The law only regulates the manner by which these 
responsibilities become enforceable.278 
Non-voluntary obligations, on the other hand, involve substantive 
rules that relate to content. In promulgating these rules, society cares 
about what behavior is deemed permissible or impermissible. This is 
                                                                                                                 
 274. See supra Part I.B. 
 275. This is similar to Hart’s analysis that contract law embodies secondary rules. See H.L.A. Hart, 
The Concept of Law, (Oxford 1994), Chapter V. However, Hart discusses these rules for the purpose of 
providing a typology of a robust legal system, not explaning the treatment of a resulting breach of these 
rules. 
 276. The requirement that the consideration be more than just a pretense is not inconsistent. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. b (1981). This requirement is not substantive; it 
simply mandates that the two parties actually bargain in good faith for a price. See id. 
 277. There are some limited exceptions. See id. § 178 (contract not enforceable on grounds of public 
policy); id. § 266 (contract not enforceable because of practical impossibility). 
 278. The legal rules surrounding fraudulent inducement are also non-substantive in that they regulate 
how one makes promises (i.e., one cannot misrepresent her intentions), not what the content of the 
promises must be. Id. § 167. 
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most easily understood in the criminal context, which prohibits 
specific conduct. For instance, one cannot hurt someone else or take 
someone’s property without permission. Here, society has 
determined what the appropriate conduct should be and requires 
individuals to follow these mandates. In Scenario (1), for instance, 
the perpetrator was under a non-voluntary obligation not to 
permanently deprive you of your property without permission. As a 
member of society she was not free to disregard this duty. Tort law 
also regulates substantive conduct. An individual must use a 
particular level of care when performing an activity. Like a criminal 
duty, this obligation is imposed on all individuals by their status as 
members of society. In Scenario (2), for instance, the perpetrator was 
required to use a reasonable level of care instead of voluntarily 
choosing the standard she believed most appropriate.279 
By design, the rules governing the creation of voluntary 
obligations do not regulate the substance of the duty. So, it stands to 
reason that society would not have a great interest in criminalizing 
any resulting violation of duties arising from these rules. The contract 
breacher merely violates a mutually agreed upon duty. An intentional 
violation, therefore, represents a private wrong in which an 
individual has failed to satisfy her obligation to another individual 
rather than an obligation owed directly to society. This stands in 
contrast to non-voluntary obligations, which prohibit behavior that 
society has determined to be unacceptable. An intentional violation 
of such a duty thus stands as a public-wrong where an individual has 
violated a duty owed to society. Accordingly, it stands to reason that 
society would seek to heavily sanction any violation by imposing 
criminal punishment. 
This notion does not mean that society has no interest in trying to 
regulate voluntary obligations. These acts affect individuals; 
naturally, society would have some vested interest. Indeed, as 
obligations owed directly to individuals, it makes sense that society 
                                                                                                                 
 279. This Article is not suggesting that individuals cannot contract around tort or certain criminal 
duties. But the fact remains that without such agreements, these obligations are automatically in place 
and must be followed. 
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creates rules that allow individuals themselves to bring civil 
sanctions for breaches of these obligations. Society may even 
determine that certain egregious violations of voluntary obligations, 
e.g., fraudulent inducement breaches, should receive punitive 
damages. Nevertheless, these voluntary obligations do not rise to the 
same level of importance as non-voluntary obligations. 
To be clear, this Article is not presenting a new account of why 
only crimes receive punishment. Culpability remains the operative 
principle to explain criminal liability. Even though torts represent 
non-voluntary obligations, they do not constitute culpable conduct, 
and thus, do not merit criminal punishment. Crimes and contract 
breaches, however, are both worthy of condemnation. It is just how 
we conceive of this culpability that changes. The individual who 
commits a crime violates a non-voluntary obligation, one that was 
already in place and was not agreed upon with another. Society, not 
mutual agreement, imposed this duty on this individual, which 
explains why this breach alone receives criminal punishment. The 
contract breach constitutes a different type of responsibility. Because 
this person intentionally violated a voluntary obligation that she 
chose to undertake with another person, the resulting breach does not 
carry criminal punishment. 
This voluntary/non-voluntary obligation distinction also explains 
why the moral-based and economic positions do not correlate in the 
same way when it comes to contract breaches, but they do when it 
comes to crimes and torts.280 The Z-axis showing culpability is best 
understood as charting the blameworthiness of the various non-
voluntary obligations society imposes on its members, not voluntary 
obligations agreed upon by individuals. This interpretation makes 
sense, especially when considering the economic and moral-based 
approaches as representing an integrated overall societal structure. 
Klevorick focuses on society’s “transaction structure,” and Dau-
Schmidt discusses how society shapes individual preferences. Both 
emphasize society’s social, moral, and economic values, and how 
                                                                                                                 
 280. Compare Diagram C, with Diagram D. 
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collectively, these factors influence the treatment of common law 
breaches. 
So, it is not surprising that when it comes to torts and crimes, the 
economic and moral-based approaches correlate positively. Both 
criminal and tort breaches correspond to underlying non-voluntary 
obligations that are part of societal structure in a way that voluntary 
obligations are not. This fact allows us to chart their respective 
culpability on the same continuum. However, a contract breach—
because it represents a voluntary obligation—would not necessarily 
fall on the same continuum. It is a created obligation that does not 
exist until after an individual enters into a contract. Therefore, it 
cannot be graphically represented on the same line with torts or 
crimes. 
The unique nature of a contractual responsibility does not have any 
impact on how the economic model deals with this breach. The 
efficiency/deterrence relationship applies in the same way to contract 
breaches as it does to crimes and torts. This is not surprising. The 
economic analysis does not seek to evaluate the nature of the 
respective responsibilities. By design, this model only focuses on the 
behavior itself and to what extent it constitutes efficient conduct. It is 
irrelevant then whether the obligation was created by individuals or 
already in place. The distinction between a non-voluntary and 
voluntary obligation also provides an explanation as to why scholars 
have focused only on torts and crimes when discussing the distinction 
between civil and criminal liability. As non-voluntary obligations, 
they stand as natural comparisons. Contracts are something different. 
They represent voluntary transactions where the responsibility was 
voluntarily created. 
CONCLUSION 
One might wonder whether this exercise has any use beyond mere 
intellectual curiosity. Here, this Article submits that this analysis 
sheds light on how society values contractual responsibilities. The 
above conclusions point to a system that finds intentional-based legal 
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breaches arising out of voluntary transactions to be economically 
valuable or fundamental to society and thus not to warrant criminal 
punishment. This system suggests a society that values the ability of 
its citizens to freely engage in market transactions—and create 
agreed upon obligations—without the threat of criminal punishment. 
Society may deem a contract breacher a “bad person” and go so far 
as to permit heightened civil sanctions against her. Still, this person’s 
intentional unlawful conduct does not put her in the same category as 
a criminal. Only with a crime has the person violated a non-voluntary 
obligation owed directly to society. 
But the discussion cannot end there. With at least one type of 
contract breach—namely fraudulent inducement—society seems to 
have changed, at least partly, its perspective. For the purposes of this 
paper, the reasonable assumption was made that Scenario (3’) would 
only receive civil sanctions. However, a growing number of 
jurisdictions now criminalize this type of fraudulent behavior.281 For 
instance, federal wire and mail fraud statutes criminalize the taking 
of property by fraudulent promises.282 This seems to suggest a 
change in how society, or at least some jurisdictions, views these 
types of contractual breaches and accordingly a change in how to 
apply the economic and moral-based models. What does this change 
mean for the economic and moral-based models? How exactly did 
the efficiency calculus change when comparing the common law 
regime—where fraudulent promises were not criminally punished—
with the current federal statutory scheme? Is the shift better explained 
through society’s change in mores and culture, corresponding to a 
shift in how society values certain voluntary obligations? These 
questions remain to be answered. For now, it is enough to say that 
employing the economic and moral-based models can help one 
understand how society views or values contract responsibilities. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 281. See supra note 50. 
 282. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006). 
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